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USING IMPARTIAL EXPERTS IN VALUATIONS:
A FORUM-SPECIFIC APPROACH
Courts routinely must make valuations of property In arriv-
ing at determinations of value, courts rely on expert testimony'
Unfortunately, because the parties to the case hire these ex-
perts, their opimons often diverge greatly, resulting in very little
meamngful guidance for the court as to an accurate valuation.
Consider the following:
In proceedings to determine compensation following the feder-
al government's partial taking of plaintiffs timberland, plaintiff
and defendant both presented expert testimony 2 Plaintiffs ex-
pert posited that the condemned property was worth $51 mil-
lion, while the government's expert estimated the land to be
worth only $1.4 million.'
In litigation surrounding the value of a minority shareholder's
stake in a closely held corporation,4 petitioner's expert estimat-
ed the company to be worth $20,700,000, while "respondent's
expert valued the same business, as of the same day, at
$71,000-a difference of nearly thirty thousand percent!"'5
In a tax dispute concermng the valuation of artwork which
was the subject of a charitable contribution,6 the taxpayer val-
ued the painting at $150,000, while the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue valued it at a mere $2,000, each party offering a
battery of expert witnesses to buttress its argument.7
To cope with these divergences, courts often order a "splitting
of the difference" between the two camps or discount one or both
1. See Thomas D. Hall, Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock: Control Premiums
and Minority Discounts, 31 EMORY L.J. 139, 146 (1982) ("Valuation is an issue of
fact that is largely the province of expert witnesses.").
2. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 328 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
3. Id. at 335.
4. Tames v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup.
Ct. 1983), affd, 486 N.Y.S.2d 699 (App. Div. 1985).
5. Id. at 365.
6. Farber v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1974), affd, 535 F.2d 1241 (2d
Cir. 1975).
7. Id. at 673.
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side's expert altogether. Neither of these results is satisfactory
Wide use of the split-difference solution creates an incentive for
parties' experts to artificially inflate or deflate their appraisals,8
whereas the wholesale disregard of one or both experts obviates
entirely the purpose of expert testimony
Rather than guide courts through an increasingly complex
maze of technical terminology and financial calculation, expert
witnesses in the valuation context often hinder the pursuit of a
fair and accurate appraisal. Judge David Schwartz, then of the
United States Court of Claims, characterized the problem as
follows:
The trier must first judge the qualifications of the opposing
experts, then try to understand their presentations, pass on
their sincerity and credibility, and finally choose between
opposing conclusions. Throughout, there is the uneasy doubt
as to an appropriate discount for partisanship. Have the wit-
nesses, both or one of them, anticipated a discount by the
trier and hiked their opimons twice, once for discount and
once for loyalty to their client, or only once, or even not at
all?9
8. The United States Tax Court, which handles numerous valuation claims, see
infra note 194, stated its frustration with the split-difference methodology in Buffalo
Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441 (1980), and admitted its
own ineffectiveness in coping with appraisals. The court urged the parties to seek
resolution amongst themselves, rather than force the court to take the time and
effort merely to reach the "Solomon-like adjustment" that the parties had planned
and the court's lack of appraisal expertise practically demanded:
The existing record reeks of stubbornness rather than flexibility on the
part of both parties We are convinced that the valuation issue is
capable of resolution by the parties themselves thereby saving the
expenditure of time, effort, and money by the parties and the Court-a
process not likely to produce a better result. Indeed each of the parties
should keep in mind that, in the final analysis, the Court may find the
evidence of valuation by one of the parties sufficiently more convincing
than that of the other party, so that the final result will produce a sig-
nificant financial defeat for one or the other, rather than the middle-of-
the-road compromise which we suspect each of the parties expects the
Court to reach. If the parties insist on our valuing any or all of the
assets, we will. We do not intend to avoid our responsibilities but instead
seek to administer them more efficiently
Id. at 451-52.
9. David Schwartz, Impact of the New Federal Rules of Evidence on the Court's
Rules, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1976 COURT OF CLAIMS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 205,
IMPARTIAL EXPERTS IN VALUATIONS
This Note devises a method by which courts might defuse
some of the more common problems associated with expert testi-
mony in the valuation context. The first part of the Note dis-
cusses the many shortfalls of partisan expert testimony The
Note then highlights possible solutions to the difficulties posed
by the prevalence of expert testimony, suggesting that the use of
court-appointed experts is especially well suited to the valuation
context, and discussing the common law and statutory authority
of courts to appoint impartial experts. Next, the Note focuses on
valuation issues in three specialty fora-the United States Tax
Court, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Dela-
ware Chancery Court-and argues that certain characteristics
pertaimng to these three fora make each umquely suited to
circumvent many of the practical and theoretical difficulties
associated with the use of impartial experts. Finally, the Note
sketches out a series of recommendations for these three fora by
which each successfully might adopt the use of court-appointed
experts in future valuation issues.
SHORTFALLS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Partisan expert testimony is used in many contexts.' ° In a
valuation action, however, divergence of expert opimon is per-
haps the starkest, given that the object of offering expert opinion
is to arrve at a single, critical, dollar figure. Regardless of con-
text, however, the problems resulting from the use of partisan
experts are the same. This part of the Note will outline the
shortcomings of partisan expert testimony
A judge or jury is an inexpert fact finder." This lack of ex-
pertise creates an incentive for the parties to hire the best (or at
214-15 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Comment, Always a Borrower- Law and Other Disci-
plines, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1029, 1032-33 ("[Clourts are besieged by experts testifying
about whether a particular defendant is insane, has manufactured a 'safe' product,
exercised common medical skill, discriminated in employment, priced below cost,
worsened competition, or possessed a 'monopoly.' ").
ii. Hence the need arises for experts to present "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge [to] assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue " FED. R. Evi.. 702.
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least the most) experts that money can buy Two categories of
problems arise: justice-oriented and efficzency-ortented."2 Jus-
tice-oriented criticisms of the system relate to the parties' ability
to use partisan experts to obfuscate issues or to give one side an
unfair advantage. The efficiency-onented problems relate to the
huge cost of partisan experts in terms of time, money, and other
resources, to the parties and to the already overburdened system
of state and federal courts. These two categories are not discrete,
as many efficiency-related problems have justice-onented im-
plications."
Battles of the Experts
The "battle of the experts," wherein two experts with diamet-
rically opposed views opine on the issue at hand, leaves the
court in little better position than when it started. An "eviden-
tiary stalemate" results from conflicting testimony, with each
expert's opinion counteracting that of the other. The court is left
with no guidance whatsoever. 4
Conflicting expert testimony might even put the court in a
worse position. At least one federal judge has noted that battling
experts create more potential for confusion than for enlighten-
ment. 5 In its distrust of all experts, the court might disregard
the valid testimony along with the invalid."6 One commentator
12. See Tahirih V Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Pro-
posal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'f REV.
480, 502 (1988) (positing that the use of partisan expert testimony interferes with
three goals of our adjudicative system--"truth-seeking, equal access, and efficiency").
13. The degree of interrelation is particularly high when the lngh cost of litigation
works to deny a party access to the judicial system. See infra notes 21-24 and ac-
companying text (discussing deprivation of access to the courts).
14. Lee, supra note 12, at 488. On occasion, the court might prefer to be without
the sort of guidance a partisan expert might offer. The trial judge in Tames v. Gene
Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. 1983), affd, 486
N.Y.S.2d 699 (App. Div. 1985), manifested his frustration with the partisan expert
system, stating that "both experts' reasoning [is] fallacious and their conclusions
preposterous, and I give no weight whatsoever to either of their ultimate conclusions
.as to the value of the business." Id. at 365.
15. Francis L. Van Dusen, A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial
Medical Expert System, 32 F.R.D. 498, 501 (1962) (citing David W. Peck, Impartial
Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1958)).
16. See John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own
1244
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argues that battles of experts inevitably result from partisan
expert testimony, and that the litigation process creates a nat-
ural bias, resulting in courts having nothing but biased experts
before them. 7
Risk of Nonproductwn
A second shortcoming of partisan expert testimony is that the
court's sole reliance on party experts to produce evidence might
result in the nonproduction of certain evidence crucial to the
court's decisionmaling process. 8 Highlighting this danger,
Judge Tannenbaum of the U.S. Tax Court lamented in Farber9
the vast amount of information not disclosed by the five experts
put on the stand by the parties: 'We can only conclude that the
primary guideline for presentation of the case by both parties
was that the less, rather than the more, the Court knew, the
better. '0
Deprivatin of Access to Courts
An emphasis on partisan experts favors the party with the
greater resources, especially in technical or highly complex liti-
gation, such as might surround a valuation issue. The wealthier
party can lure not only better experts,21 but also more ex-
Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 199 (1956) ("[Ilt is possible that perfectly
good points in a party's argument may fail to win acceptance, because the judge or
jury has become distrustful of all experts.").
17. Id. at 197 (arguing that the trial lawyer's object is to make an expert a mem-
ber of his team and that the expert begins to identify his position and its success
with his own reputation).
18. Lee, supra note 12, at 484 ("Sole reliance on the parties to produce expert
guidance for the court and jury creates a risk of nonproduction of expert evidence.");
see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) ("[The trial judge need not blindfold himself by failing to call an available
vital witness simply because the parties, for reasons of trial tactics, chose to with-
hold his testimony.").
19. Farber v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1974), affd, 535 F.2d 1241 (2d
Cir. 1975); see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
20. Farber, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 674-75. The parties presented no evidence as to
the disputed pamting's original purchase, the terms of its purchase, its insured val-
ue, or the fair market value of similar paintings from catalogues. Other pertinent
evidence was also "cavalierly ignored." Id. at 674.
21. Those experts with the greatest prestige, reputation, name, or stage presence
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pertsY In this manner, a disparity of resources can act to de-
prive a party opponent of access to the judicial system.'n A par-
ty with especially limited resources might be unable to hire an
expert altogether.24
Emphasis on Quantity of Experts
Devotion of generous resources to the hiring of expert witness-
es also can undermine the efficiency of the judicial process by
emphasizing the quantity of witnesses.2 ' For the party to whom
cost is less important, it makes good sense to attempt to bury
the party opponent with the sheer amount of expert testimony
which one can marshal for his case.26
Although the presence of more experts favors the wealthy
litigant with much riding on the outcome of his case, from the
fact finders' standpoint the experts' participation means more
testimony to hear and more reports to evaluate. Overuse of ex-
perts puts further demands on already strained judicial resourc-
es."7 The hiring of additional experts might be intended not
will be the most sought after and, therefore, the most expensive. See Lee, supra
note 12, at 482 ("Naturally, the most respected and accomplished experts will com-
mand the highest fees.").
22. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing quantity of experts).
23. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger- The Shortage of Adjudica-
tive Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1808, 1830-31 (1986) (discussing the incentives to overwhelm an opponent with
greater resources); Lee, supra note 12, at 482-83.
24. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 75 (1978) (i[Slome parties may be unable to procure the
assistance of an expert, because either they cannot afford one or they cannot con-
vince one to help.").
25. See Alschuler, supra note 23, at 1830.
26. Sink, supra note 16, at 199 ("[Tihe expense and uncertainty are justified by
the chance of a large verdict which will be none the less valuable because secured
by partisan testimony."). Commentators' arguments resemble those made in the
abuse of discovery context. One commentator even connects the two phenomena,
stating that documents relating to expert testimony may "constitute a significant
bulk of discovery avalanches." Lee, supra note 12, at 487.
27. See Winans v. New York & E.R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 101 (1858) ("[it
often occurs that not only many days, but even weeks, are consumed m cross-exanu-
nations, wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and jury
"); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 328, 334-35 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (deny-
ing request for the calling of a court-appointed expert because evidence would be
cumulative).
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simply to bury the opponent but also to bury the trer of fact,
particularly where arcane economic evidence of the type relied
upon in a valuation action is involved.28
Expert Shopping
The partisan expert system has led to "expert shopping." 9
Not surprisingly, litigants seek out experts with opinions favor-
able to their case. As a result the court hears only those opin-
ions that the parties want it to hear. More than one hundred
years ago, an English court sitting in a patent case lamented the
reality of expert shopping and outlined the shopping process as
follows:
The mode m which expert evidence is obtained is such as not
to give the fair result of scientific opimon to the court. A man
may go, and does sometimes, to half-a-dozen experts He
takes their honest opinons, he finds three in his favor and
three against him; he says to the three in his favor, Will you
be kind enough to give evidence? and he pays the three
against him their fees and leaves them alone; the other side
does the same It may not be three out of six, it may be
three out of fifty I was told in one case, where a person
wanted a certain thing done, that they went to sixty-eight
people before they found one That is an extreme case no
doubt, but it may be done, and therefore I have always the
greatest possible distrust of scientific evidence of this kind,
not only because it is umversally contradictory, and the mode
of its selection makes it necessarily contradictory, but be-
cause I know of the way in which it is obtained. I am sorry to
say the result is that the Court does not get that assistance
from the experts which, if they were unbiased and fairly
chosen, it would have a right to expect."0
28. Hays Gorey, Jr. & Henry A. Einhorn, The Use and Misuse of Economic Evi-
dence in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases, 12 J. CONTEMP L. 1, 1 (1986) (stating that
economic evidence is sometimes "offered simply to confuse the jury by making the
case unnecessarily complex or confusing") (footnote omitted).
29. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note.
30. Thorn v. Worthing Skating Rink Co., 6 Ch. D. 415n-416n (1876), quoted in
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 213; Van Dusen, supra note 15, at 499.
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Corrupt Experts
Although most partisan experts "bought" by a party are true
to their convictions and base their opinions on valid and general-
ly accepted methodology, the "venality of some experts remains a
risk."3 1 Committed to the perpetuation of the partisan expert
system, the trial lawyer would counter that cross-examination of
expert witnesses should root out corrupt experts.3 ' Not all trial
lawyers are uniformly competent, however, and reliance on this
systemic safeguard runs the risk that expert corruption will not
be exposed.33 Indeed, even the most competent attorney might
have difficulty exposing a dishonest expert. 4
Alienatin of the Most Qualified Experts
Because the practice of shopping for experts has at least creat-
ed the perception of the "hired gun"35 who will say anyting for
money, many reputable experts refuse to serve when called upon
by a litigant. 6 Professor Wigmore stated that, as the use of
31. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note.
32. See generally ROBERT L. HABUSH, ART OF ADVOCACY-CROSS EXAMINATION OF
NON-MEDICAL EXPERTS (1992) (discussing the various means to impeach expert wit-
nesses).
33. See John Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials-A Comparative Appraisal,
40 MOD. L. REV 174, 174 (1977) ("The corrupt expert may be a rare phenomenon,
but will not necessarily be exposed by an inexpert cross-examination.").
34. See HABUSH, supra note 32, § 1.0915] ("Everyone has faced an expert that they
know is not being honest, but they lack the means or tools to expose the deceit.").
35. Professor John Langbem notes that trial lawyers often refer to experts as
"saxophones," the idea being that "the lawyer plays the tune, manipulating the ex-
pert as though the expert were a musical instrument on which the lawyer sounds
the desired notes." John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985). Professor Samuel Gross less charitably avers that
"lawyers and experts alike see expert witnesses-those members of other learned
professions who will consort with lawyers-as whores." Samuel R. Gross, Expert
Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115; see also id. at 1135 ("The contempt of law-
yers and judges for experts is famous They speak of maintaining 'stables' of
experts, beasts to be chosen and harnessed at the will of their masters.").
36. In this regard, Professor Sink notes the irony that while the high cost of an
expert witness may not inhibit a litigant, he may "still be unable to obtain the best
qualified doctors to appear in his behalf , owing to the reluctance which some
of these men feel toward appearing in court." Sink, supra note 16, at 199 (citing
Samuel R. Gerber, Expert Medical Testimony and the Medical Expert, in PHYSICIAN
IN THE COURTROOM 73 (Oliver Schroeder, Jr., ed., 1954)).
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expert testimony increased, "[pirofessional men of honorable
instincts and high scientific standards began to look upon the
witness box as a golgotha, and to disclaim all respect for the
law's methods of investigation."" Men and women of honorable
instincts and high standards are, of course, precisely the people
that the legal system contemplated having testify when the idea
of allowing a "witness qualified as an expert" to "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue" was devised. If these experts refuse to serve out of fear
for their reputation, the whole system quickly unravels. 9
Danger of the Trier of Fact Being Misled
The final, and probably most disturbing, flaw of the partisan
expert system arises from the fact finder's lack of expertise. The
judge or jury has few means, besides perhaps their own sense
impressions, upon which to evaluate an expert's testimony An
expert's success might well depend more upon his demeanor and
believability than upon the veracity of his opinions. In this re-
gard, Judge Van Dusen stated that "the lawyers become more
interested in retaining a good testifier than in retaining a good
doctor "'o
This phenomenon is exemplified in the bench trial of Wells v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,41 a toxic tort case in which the
judge found that a contraceptive manufactured by the defendant
caused birth defects. The judge stated that he had "evaluated
the rationality of each expert's testimony in light of all the evi-
dence presented" and had "paid close attention to each expert's
demeanor and tone."4" He based his opinion on his finding that
37. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 563 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
38. FED. R. EvID. 702.
39. Although individual experts may be alienated from the legal system because of
the general lack of respect it accords the partisan expert, one commentator has
stated that potential expert witnesses, and indeed whole professions "on which the
judicial system is reliant," might also be "antagomzed by adversary trial procedure."
Basten, supra note 33, at 174.
40. Van Dusen, supra note 15, at 501 (emphasis added) (quoting David W Peck,
Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1958)).
41. 615 F Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 950 (1986).
42. Id. at 267.
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the testimony of plaintiffs experts was "competent" and "credi-
ble" whereas the testimony of defendant's experts "often indi-
cated bias or inconsistency 4
Most observers agree, however, that although legally well
reasoned, the Wells decision is scientifically wrong. Numerous
articles in the national and medical press excoriated the Wells
decision as against the weight of all scientific evidence' and
"an intellectual embarrassment."45 Wells continues to engender
controversy, and proponents of expert evidence reform often use
it as an example of justice gone awry4" Even one of the
plaintiffs experts, the author of a study investigating the rela-
tionship between spermicide use and birth defects, warned
Judge Marvin Shoob, who presided in the case, "not to construe
[the study] as proving a link between spermicides and birth de-
fects."4 In light of the verdict, the expert later remarked that
Judge Shoob "either ignored or failed to understand" this crucial
testimony 48
SOLUTIONS
Recognition of the shortcomings of partisan expert testimony
is not new 49 In 1905, Judge Learned Hand wrote of the confu-
43. Id.
44. James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and "Litogens," 315 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1234, 1235 (1986) ("[T]he overwhelming body of evidence indicates that
spermicides are not teratogenic."), quoted in Gross, supra note 35, at 1122.
45. Federal Judges us. Science, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1986, at A22 (unsigned edito-
rial), quoted in Gross, supra note 35, at 1124.
46. See David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the Courtroom, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24,
1993, at A15 (citing Wells as the "most prominent" of a "series of embarrassing
decisions in cases involving scientific evidence").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Since at least the middle of the 19th century, commentators and courts have
decried the use of partisan experts as a time-consuming and often counterproductive
means of seeking justice. See, e.g., Winans v. New York & E.R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.)
88, 101 (1858) (stating that examination of experts is time-consuming, "often
wasting the time and wearying the patience of both court and jury, and perplexing,
instead of elucidating, the questions involved in the issue"); 2 WIGMORE, supra note
37, § 563 ('By any standard of efficiency, the orthodox method [of partisan expert
testimony] registers itself as a failure, in cases where the slightest pressure is put
upon it.").
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sion caused a jury by conflicting expert opimons," concluding
that "[the jury] will do no better with the so-called testimony of
experts than without, except where it is unanimous."5 Over the
years, various commentators have made proposals for reform of
the partisan expert system. This section of the Note discusses
proposed solutions, applies each to the problems posed by expert
appraisals, and concludes that, of each of the solutions dis-
cussed, the use of court-appointed witnesses lends itself most
readily to the valuation context.
The valuation claim of the type contemplated by this Note
generally involves the resolution of only one issue: the appraisal
itself. Although protracted litigation provides incentives for the
court system to undertake the fashioning of a high cost, innova-
tive procedure suited to individual circumstances,52 this Note
seeks a practical solution for the limited circumstances of the
routine valuation action.
An effective remedy first must address efficiency and justice
concerns.53 To be practical, however, a solution also must be
applied easily and with a nummum of preparation. Furthermore,
a solution must be theoretically unassailable-providing the
parties with grounds for appeal would be counterproductive for a
scheme that seeks to save the judicial system time and effort.
Finally, any successful solution must be flexible enough to be
easily modified to fit a variety of circumstances.
50. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 55 (1901). "What hope have the jury, or any other lay-
man, of a rational decision between conflicting statements each based upon [a
lifetime of technical] experience." Id. In his consideration of whether expert witnesses
were used in the best possible manner, Hand set out to prove two things, "first,
that logically the expert is an anomaly; second, that from the legal anomaly senous
practical difficulties arise." Id. at 50.
51. Id. at 56.
52. See infra notes 54-118 and accompanying text (discussing judicial exclusion,
advisory juries, special master, and government agency solutions to the expert prob-
lem).
53. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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Exclusion of Partisan Expert Testimony
One means of coping with the problem of partisan experts is
to exclude their testimony altogether, thus conserving the re-
sources of both the litigants and the court.
Pretrial Exclusin
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables trial
courts to compel pretrial conferences of the parties and to sched-
ule the trial process through pretrial orders. 4 Through use of
this considerable discretion in the scheduling and management
54. Rule 16 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in
its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it
for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough prepa-
ration, and;
(5) facilitating settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants
at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the
elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing poten-
tially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues,
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
(e) Pretrial Orders. After any conference held pursuant to this rule,
an order shall be entered reciting the action taken. This order shall con-
trol the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent
order. The order following a final pretrial conference shall be modified
only to prevent manifest injustice.
FED. R. CIV. P 16.
The Note will use the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as a proxy for all American rules of court. Where relevant, state ana-
logues to the Federal Rules will be addressed. See, e.g., infra note 134 (enumerating
state analogues to Federal Rule of Evidence 706).
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of trials, judges may limit the number of experts or the scope or
subject matter of expert testimony 5
Exclusin Resulting in Summary Judgment
Federal Judge Jack Weinstein used the grant of a party's
motion in linune to exclude expert testimony and manage his
unwieldy docket in the protracted "Agent Orange" litigation."
In this mass tort action, certain plaintiffs had opted out of the
$180 million class settlement to pursue individual claims. The
defendant chemical manufacturer moved for summary judgment
on the causation issue.57 The plaintiffs responded with affida-
vits from medical experts stating that, in the experts' opimon,
exposure to Agent Orange caused the plaintiffs' injuries.58 A
simple assertion by someone adjudged a medical expert is gener-
ally enough to survive an initial causation inquiry and send the
case to trial. 9  Judge Weinstein, however, granted the
defendant's motion in limine to exclude the expert's affidavits as
lacking adequate foundation. Because the plaintiffs could not
produce evidence on the causation issue, Judge Weinstein grant-
ed defendant's motion for summary judgment.6'
In Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,62 another mass tort action, a
federal judge used the exclusion of plaintiffs expert to grant
defendant's motion for summary judgment. In Viterbo, the judge
ruled the expert's affidavit as to causation inadmissible on the
55. Sink, supra note 16, at 199.
56. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. dented, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) [hereinafter
Agent Orange 11; In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F Supp. 1267
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. dented, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988) [hereinafter Agent Orange I].
57. Agent Orange I, 611 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
58. Id.
59. E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for
Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 497 (1989).
60. Agent Orange I, 611 F. Supp. at 1253, 1255-56; Agent Orange II, 611 F Supp.
at 1281-83.
61. Agent Orange I, 611 F. Supp. at 262-64; Agent Orange II, 611 F Supp. at
1284-85; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (reiterating
that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment when plaintiff is unable to
produce evidence on an essential element of his claun).
62. 646 F Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986), affd, 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
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grounds that it was based on data which were not reliable, with-
out probative force, and not objective because the expert sought
employment from the plaintiff and not vice versa."
Exclusion Using the Federal Rules of Evidence
Since his Agent Orange decisions, Judge Weinstein has writ-
ten that expert testimony can be excluded through creative use
of three Federal Rules of Evidence.
First, there is Rule 703, which allows an expert to base his
opinion on the type of evidence reasonably relied upon by
experts in his field. In some cases, examination of the basis of
an expert's opinion reveals that it is supported by no reliable
evidence at all. In such cases exclusion of the expert's opinion
under Rule 703 and a grant of summary judgment to the
opposing party might be appropriate. In other cases, an
expert's opinion is supported by some credible evidence, but
further investigation reveals that there is other, much more
persuasive evidence available which undermines the expert's
opinion and which the expert is ignoring. In these cases, the
court might exclude the expert's testimony either under Rule
702, as not being helpful to the trier of fact, or under Rule
403, as being likely to mislead the jury Both the reasoning
and the result are much the same, regardless of which rule is
used.64
Exclusion of Novel Scientific Evidence
The Supreme Court recently devised a test for the exclusion of
novel scientific evidence similar to Judge Weinstein's, outlined
above. As articulated last term in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,65 the new doctrine abrogates the seventy-
year-old Frye rule66 in favor of the less stringent standards of
63. Id. at 1424-26.
64. Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 493
(1986) (citations omitted).
65. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
66. The Frye rule provided that when expert testimony was "deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction [was]
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 702,67 enacted in 1975, fifty years af-
ter Frye.68 The Court stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 702
supersedes the previous common law69 and that the "rigid
'general acceptance' requirement [is] at odds with the 'liberal
thrust' of the Federal Rules."7 ° Pursuant to Rule 702 and
Daubert, a trial judge must inquire as to the relevance and reli-
ability of novel scientific evidence,7' determine whether the
expert's testimony will aid the court in deterimmng a fact in is-
sue, 7 2 and decide whether the expert's "knowledge" was derived
by application of the scientific method.73
The Frye and Daubert rules generally contemplate the exclu-
sion of scientific evidence such as lie detector tests74 or pharma-
cological studies of a drug's chemical structure.75 However, the
Frye rule and the new Daubert test also have been used to eval-
uate and exclude expert economic testimony, including testimo-
ny of the type made in valuation actions.76
1923).
67. Rule 702 reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto m the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
68. Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Eases Admissibility of Experts, NAT'L L.J., July
12, 1993, at 12.
69. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing Bouiaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987)).
70. Id. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
71. Id. at 2795.
72. Id. at 2795-96.
73. Id. at 2795.
74. Frye concerned the use of a predecessor of the modem polygraph in the mur-
der trial of appellant James A. Frye. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
75. One of the issues in Daubert concerned the admissibility of a pharmacological
study comparing the chemical structure of the drug Bendectin, alleged to have
caused birth defects in plaintiff's children, with the chemical structure of other sub-
stances known to cause birth defects. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
76. See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 187 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that the trial judge "could not properly have admitted" the valuation
testimony of plaintiffs expert, because the judge did not undertake an assessment of
the expert's methodology before allowing him.to testify); Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F
Supp. 1097, 1102-03 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (barring the use of testimony of an expert econ-
onst as to the monetary value of the "pleasure of life" on grounds that such science
is not generally accepted in the economic community).
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Shortcomings of Exclusion
Use of the exclusion remedies outlined above, however, raises
several problems in the appraisal context. Most of the appraisal
methods that a partisan expert uses in, for example, a stock
valuation, will be well accepted in the professional community,
making a Frye-type exclusion not relevant. The difference in
interpretation will arse not because of the method used, but
because of the application of the method by each expert."
Exclusion of experts probably would not reduce the net ex-
pense of litigation. Although such an exclusion would result in
fewer witnesses, more weight would be given to each, extending
direct and cross-examination and thus countering any cost sav-
ings for parties who pay experts by the hour," and for the
courts, who have to hear and digest the additional testimony 9
In addition, because exclusion would work to limit only the
number of experts, it does little to ameliorate justice-orented
77. See infra note 199 (discussing the economic analysis undertaken in In re Shell
Oil Appraisal and the differing conclusions reached by experts using the same gener-
al methodology). The universe of generally accepted economic valuation methodology
is finite. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (governing the valuation of cor-
porations). Regulatory rulings such as Revenue Ruling 59-60 list factors which may
be considered, but give no guidance as to how those factors are to be applied. See
Steven M. Loeb, Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests, in PREPARATION OF
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX RETURN AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS FOR ESTATE PLANNING
569-601 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series No. 169, 1986) (outlining each of
the predominant methods by which close corporations can be valued and the differ-
ent applications of each); Michael F Beausang, Jr., Valuation: General and Real
Estate, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 132-3d (1992) (reviewing the methods commonly used
in the valuation of assets, including real estate, financial instruments, and personal
property); Judith F Todd & Candace L. Hemphill, Valuation of Corporate Stock, Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) No. 831 (1992) (discussing the approach to valuation of Revenue Rul-
ing 59-60 and the valuation process for interests in privately and publicly held cor-
porations).
78. See Sink, supra note 16, at 199 (stating that experts are paid for time in
court and thus extra time on the stand adds commensurately to party expense).
79. Id. Courts have suggested that parties gain little by the presentation of mul-
tiple experts. See Cullers v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 1956) (hold-
ing that the benefit of three separate appraisals is not lost by the similarity of the
valuations therein, but that it is "not particularly surprising that [the three apprais-
ers] came up with substantially similar valuations"). In addition, cumulative experts
might undercut one another. See Jacob D. Fuchsberg, Two Experts for Defendant
Neutralize Each Other, in JULIUS B. LEVINE, WINNING TRIAL ADVOCACY 81-82 (1989)
(discussing "overtrial of a case by calling too many witnesses").
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problems. The litigants still can confuse the fact finder with
widely divergent partisan expert testimony
Appointment of a Special Fact Finder
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c)"0 permits trial by an
"advisory jury" in any action not triable of right by a jury, or by
a binding jury with the consent of both parties. Given that the
valuation issues addressed in this Note do not entitle the parties
to a jury,8 Rule 39(c) might provide a viable solution to the
expert appraisal dilemma."
Use of an advisory jury, however, would involve prohibitively
high judicial expense. A judge would have to find and appoint a
jury of advisors on his own, devising mechanisms by which they
might be paid and excused, and by which new advisors might be
appointed in the event of death or excusal. Rule 39(c) provides
no guidance on these issues or on any of the myriad consider-
ations which might come into play when a court sua sponte or
upon motion of a party decides to appoint an advisory jury
The problems of appointment of a binding jury include the
above practical concerns, plus any theoretical obstacles posed by
the trial judge's abdication of responsibility In addition, the
80. The text of the rule provides as follows:
(c) Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent. In all actions not triable of
right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try
any issue with an advisory jury or, except m actions against the United
States when a statute of the United States provides for trial without a
jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with
a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a
matter of right.
FED. R. CIv. P 39(c).
81. See infra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing lack of jury right in the
U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and the Delaware Chancery
Court).
82. Some jurisdictions allow for the appointment of special panels to undertake a
valuation of property taken by the state pursuant to its condemnation power. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-46.19 to 25-46.29 (Michie Supp. 1992) (providing for the
appointment of a panel of nine "condemnation commissioners" in takings actions); cf
FED. R. EvID. 706(b) (providing that the cost of a court-appointed expert will be paid
by the government in "proceedings involving just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment"); infra notes 132 and 283-85. Other jurisdictions allow for the appoint-
ment of disinterested appraisers m shareholder actions taken pursuant to statutory
appraisal rights. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-210 (1993).
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judge would have to convince both parties' lawyers to surrender
control of their cases to a body of experts with years of experi-
ence in making appraisals and preconceived notions of how such
appraisals should be made.
Although a Rule 39(c) special fact finder perhaps resolves
some of the justice-oriented concerns, it seemingly only exacer-
bates the efficiency problems, at least from the point of view of
the fact finder and court system.8"
Appointment of Special Masters
In addition to Rule 39(c) powers, courts have the power under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to appoint a special mas-
ter.' Unlike Rule 39(c), Rule 53 specifies the duties and powers
83. Cf Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1363
(1987) (identifying a "strong connection between advisory jury use and the goal of
community participation in legal proceedings," and arguing for "expanded use of the
advisory jury as one way to maintain the legitimacy of legal decisions in light of
Realist and radical critiques of the legal system").
84. Rule 53 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Appointment and Compensation. The court in which any action is
pending may appoint a special master therein. As used in these rules,
the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, and an
assessor. The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by
the court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties or paid out of
any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the custody and
control of the court as the court may direct
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not
the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury,
save in matters of account and of difficult computation, of damages, a
reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional con-
dition requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit
the master's powers and may direct the master to report only upon par-
ticular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report
evidence only and may fix the time and place for beginning and closing
the hearings and for the filing of the master's report
(e) Report.
(1) Contents and Filing. The master shall prepare a report upon the
matters submitted to the master by the order of reference and, if re-
quired to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, the master shall
set them forth in the report. The master shall file the report with the
clerk of the court and serve on all parties notice of the filing. In an
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of masters,"5 as well as procedures for their compensation and
appointment."6 Federal Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has
summarized federal courts' use of special masters: "[clourts
appoint special masters as a means of addressing three overlap-
ping categories of problems: judicial limitations, shortcomings of
the traditional adjudicatory system, and shortcomings of parties
and counsel.""7 Rule 53 makes clear that "the word 'master' in-
cludes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, and an assessor."8
So described, the process of valuing disputed property would
seem to be well within the role of a master, as contemplated by
the Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, Rule 53 masters ad-
dress both the efficiency-onented and the justice-oriented criti-
action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order
of reference, the master shall file with the report a transcript of the
proceedings and of the evidence and the original exhibits. Unless other-
wise directed by the order of reference, the master shall serve a copy of
the report on each party.
(2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury the
court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10. days after being served with notice of the filing of the report
any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties.
Application to the court for action upon the report and upon objections
thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d).
The court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may
reject it in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may
recommit it with instructions.
(3) In Jury Actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master
shall not be directed to report the evidence. The master's findings upon
the issues submitted to the master are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the
court upon any objections in point of law which may be made to the re-
port.
FED. R. Civ. P 53.
85. FED. R. Civ. P 53(a), 53(c), 53(e).
86. FED. R. C1V. P 53(a), 53(b).
87. Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary
or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 394, 394 (1986). By judicial limita-
tions, Judge Brazil refers to time constraints on the judiciary and judges' lack of
expertise in certain "esoteric or technologically sophisticated areas." Id. at 394. The
shortcomings that Judge Brazil mentions include the "ritualistic" formality and
uncommumcativeness that can result from standard pleading and discovery. Id. at
395. These problems include lack of communication and distrust between the parties
which can "cloud their judgment and inspire [I overkill tactics or opaque responses."
Id.
88. FED. R. CIv. P 53(a).
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cisms of the partisan expert system by injecting into the adjudi-
cation a party with quasi-judicial power89 and the time, re-
sources, and knowledge to make informed input into the fact
finding process.
The use of masters in a fact finding capacity is severely limit-
ed in practice. A court's use of a special master in a purely nnn-
isterial function is not controversial, given that such use in-
volves no exercise of discretion or judgment and is intended
simply as a timesaving device for the court.9" When the master
steps outside of these bounds, however, a basis for appeal is
established. Appellate courts have been highly critical of lower
courts' abuse of the master function,9 and commentators have
voiced concern about the increasingly adjudicatory roles (e.g.,
determination of damages, settlement, and discovery) that Rule
53 masters are filling.9
The use of special masters is not suited to all situations. In
the past, masters have worked best in protracted litigation (e.g.,
89. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P 53(e)(2) ("In an action to be tried without a jury the
court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.").
90. Brazil, supra note 87, at 395. ("In [accountings and calculations of damages
using court-approved formulae] the work of masters is not controversial because it
involves no significant exercise of judgment or discretion, no legal analysis, and no
determinations of policy.").
91. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 991 F.2d 1080,
1087 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing a special master appointment on the grounds that the
complexity of a case or the volume of work generated in a case cannot justify refer-
ence to a special master); Madrigal Audio Labs., Inc. v. Cello Ltd., 799 F.2d 814,
818 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986) (excoriating the trial judge in a complex patent case for ap-
pointing a special master solely because of Is unfamiliarity with patent law, and
holding that it is a judge's obligation, "whenever faced with unfamiliar factual or
legal issues to educate himself in those fields"); Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,
607 F.2d 737, 746-48 (6th Cir. 1979) (disallowing the fees requested by an expert
assistant to a special master on the grounds that the assistant was a constitutional
law professor, and that "the adversary system as it has developed in this country
precludes the court from receiving out-of-court advice on legal issues in a case").
92. See Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited. The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2172 (1989) (expressing "general concern about
the abdication of the judicial function to outside actors" and citing particularly to
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Altech Industries, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 650 (C.D. Cal. 1987), in which
"the court permitted a special master to preside over a jury trial with the consent of
the parties"). Silberman states that, "[n]ot only is the use of a master expensive, but
it also may delay the likelihood of focusing on the merits of the case," rd. at 2174,
and laments the fact that "important issues of policy and decision-making are subtly
being transferred from the judge to judicial adjuncts." Id. at 2168.
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mass tort actions). 3 Where the court can remove the danger of
the master's exercising his own judgment by clearly defining the
role of the master, devising rules and formulae for the master to
follow, 94 and providing adequate avenues of appeal for the par-
ties, the use of a master will be successful. As noted above, how-
ever, the average valuation action is not protracted. Therefore,
none of the economies of scale that make a court's appointment
of a master worthwhile are present in valuation cases. In addi-
tion, in a valuation action, a fact finder needs not administrative
aid, but discretionary aid (e.g., guidance about appropriate valu-
ation methodology)."5
Appointment of Technzcal Advisors
A more flexible alternative to the special master is the techm-
cal advisor, a common law judicial adjunct appointed periodical-
ly by courts as a guide through complex litigation. In Reilly v.
United States,9 the district judge in a bench trial appointed an
economist to aid him in the determination of damages in a medi-
cal malpractice case involving the negligent delivery of a
baby 9 The child, Heather Reilly, was born with severe and ir-
reparable brain damage "[a]s a result of the doctor's mamfest
negligence."98 The court needed to calculate a damage award
that accounted for the child's loss of earnings capacity, among
other factors.99 The court appointed an economist to serve in
camera as a techmcal advisor. °0 The economist's role was " 'in
the nature of a law clerk,' someone with whom the judge could
engage in 'free-wheeling discussion' " outside the earshot of the
93. See Brazil, supra note 87, at 398 ("Two notable efforts at case management
took place in the asbestos cases in Ohio and the DDT cases in Alabama. In both
settings, courts faced large numbers of claimants seeking relief from a small group
of defendants for injuries having some sources and characteristics in common.").
94. Id. at 394.
95. See supra note 77 (discussing different valuation methods and the application
of those methods).
96. 682 F Supp. 150 (D.R.I.), affd, 863 F.2d 149 (ist Cir. 1988).
97. Reilly, 682 F. Supp. at 152.
98. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 153.
99. Reilly, 682 F Supp. at 152.
100. Id.
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parties.'' The parties were excluded from the discussions be-
tween the judge and the advisor, were not provided advance
notice of the expert's appointment or identity, and were denied
an opportunity to cioss-examne the expert to determine bias or
inexperience and to test his theories and methodologies.0 2
In Reilly, the court relied at least in part on an earlier deci-
sion, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,' to es-
.tablish its "inherent authority' ' 4  to appoint a technical
advisor. O5 In United Shoe, a large and complex antitrust ac-
tion, trial judge Charles Wyzanski appointed an economist to
discuss the case with him without the parties present and to as-
sist in "analyzing the facts of record and suggesting
remedies."'
Numerous commentators have criticized the use of technical
advisors. Some years after the United Shoe decision, Judge
Wyzansli himself recanted, stating that he was mistaken not to
have made the report of the court-appointed technical advisor
available to the parties for comment."' With technical advisors
parties are denied not only an opportunity to cross-examine the
technical advisor,' but are not privy to the advisor's commu-
nications with the judge.0 9
101. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158 (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. 110 F Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). "[One court has provided an exemplary
guide to the worth and vitality of [the appointment of technical advisors] to courts
of law." Reilly, 682 F Supp. at 161.
104. Reilly, 682 F Supp. at 155.
105. The Reilly court relied more substantially on In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300
(1920), to establish this proposition. Reilly 682 F Supp. at 155, 161; see also infra
note 135 (discussing Peterson's citation as authority for courts' appointment of im-
partial experts).
106. Reilly, 682 F Supp. at 161.
107. See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARV. L. REV.
713, 715 (1987). Carl Kaysen was the economist who was appointed by Judge
Wyzanski to serve as technical advisor.
108. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).
109. See Carl J. Schuck, Techniques for Proof of Complicated Scientific and Eco-
nomic Facts, 40 F:R.D. 33, 35 (1967) ([Tlhere is a serious question whether an
economist whose personal philosophy is bound to affect his opinion--or anyone else
for that matter-should be allowed to communicate with a trial judge regarding a
case under trial in the absence of counsel.").
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The Reilly decision was upheld on appeal."' Although ap-
proving of the trial judge's use of the technical advisor, the ap-
pellate court stated that such appointments "should be reserved
for truly extraordinary cases where the introduction of outside
skills and expertise will hasten the just adjudication of a
dispute without dislodging the delicate balance of the juristic
role.""' It added that "[aippropnate instances [for appoint-
ment], we suspect, will be hen's teeth rare.""'
Although arguably working to serve the interests of justice
and efficiency,"' the use of a technical advisor will not be an
effective remedy for the partisan expert testimony dilemma until
applicable to the everyday, not only "the truly extraordinary,"
valuation.
Rule 11 Sanctions as a Deterrent
Increased imposition of Rule 11.. sanctions for unwarranted
or excessive use of experts can act as a deterrent to litigants
making use of frvolous expert opinions."' Like judicial exclu-
sion of experts, however, sanctions remedy efficiency-related
problems but do not address justice concerns. Most courts are re-
luctant to use Rule 11 to sanction parties in the first place, and
do so only in extraordinary circumstances."'
110. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 174.
111. Id. at 156.
112. Id. at 156-57.
113. A trier of fact with the unchallenged opinion of a possibly biased or
subcompetent expert may not be any closer to the truth than a trier of fact contend-
ing with partisan experts. In terms of efficiency, however, the technical advisor could
be useful in sorting through the testimony and reports of the parties' experts.
114. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court appro-
priately may sanction parties who file pleadings, motions or other papers frivolously,
to cause unnecessary- delay or increase in expense, or to harass opponent parties.
FED. R. Civ. P 11.
115. Weinstein, supra note 64, at 494. Judge Weinstein also suggests amending
Rule 11 to allow courts to sanction directly the expert uttering a frivolous opinion.
Id.
116. See SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 36-37
(1985) (finding that of 260 federal district judges surveyed, 108 had not granted any
sanctions under Rule 11 within the last 12 months and 71 of those had not received
a single request to impose a sanction; an additional 48 judges had granted a Rule
11 sanction only once). Judge Weinstein acknowledges that judicial use of Rule 11 is
rare. Weinstein, supra note 64, at 494 ("Generally, I am not in favor of such pu-
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Use of Governmental and Other Agencies
Another potential solution to the partisan expert problem is
use of governmental and independent agencies as sources of
expertise."' Judge Weinstein cites the usefulness of such agen-
cies in swine flu, toxic shock syndrome, asbestos, Agent Orange,
and DES litigation."'
This solution, however, is unsuited to the valuation context,
where few cases involve numerous plaintiffs or the serious pub-
lic issues that would warrant or make cost-effective a specially
commissioned study The routine valuation action involves a
discrete question of fact relating to the value of a umque piece of
property
COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
Yet another option in dealing with the problems of partisan
expert testimony is court appointment of an impartial expert
witness. Such a witness would be subject to traditional rules of
evidence and be treated like any other witness (i.e., subject to
cross-exanunation and prohibited from communicating with the
fact finder without the presence of counsel).
An impartial expert can address the justice and efficiency
shortcomings of partisan experts as ably as any of the solutions
enumerated above without suffering from many of the pitfalls.
In serving the interests of justice, a court-appointed expert could
remedy the fact finder's confusion by sorting through conflicting
nitive measures"). But see GEORGENE M. VAIRo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS 1-20 to 1-23
(1993) (arguing that since Rule ll's amendment in 1983, it has been "overused,"
resulting in an "avalanche of 'satellite litigation' " and having a chilling effect on
novel claims, in addition to other concerns). New amendments to Rule 11, effective
December 1, 1993, seek to ameliorate these concerns, but some argue that the
amendments render the rule "toothless." Id. at 1-23 to 1-24. The Rule 11 amend-
ments, which in general work to make Rule 11 less onerous for attorneys filing
frivolous pleadings through measures such as a 21-day safe harbor to withdraw
challenged pleadings, make it less likely that courts will use the rule as a means of
managing partisan expert testimony. See Constance M. Subadan, Congress Weakened
Rule 11 by Inaction, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994, at 15 ("[The changes to Rule 11 will
break the civil litigation system's most effective tool for policing lawyer and litigant
abuse.")
117. Weinstein, supra note 64, at 490-91.
118. Id. at 490.
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expert testimony, thus lessemng the incidence of evidentiary
stalemate. The impartial expert could apprise the court of any
important factors not being considered by the partisan experts,
thereby ameliorating the risk of nonproduction of critical evi-
dence. She could expose the venal partisan expert, if cross-exam-
ination failed to do so. She could inform the trier of fact of gen-
erally accepted professional methodology, thereby defusing some
of the dangers of "expert shopping" and giving a perspective
from which to view the testimony and reports of the partisan
expert. Finally, an impartial expert could guide the trier of fact
through partisan expert testimony, alerting it to invalid argu-
ments and helping it to rely on objective criteria, rather than its
own sense impressions. This solution also removes the incentive
to unfairly or improperly influence the court with a compelling,
but wrong, expert opimon." 9
From an efficiency perspective, an impartial expert could
remove the incentive for parties to devote excessive resources to
the hiring of experts. Although an individual expert's credentials
or the number of one party's experts might sway a judge or jury,
an impartial expert would have independent bases on which to
make his decision. Not only would litigation become less expen-
sive for the parties, but fewer experts would lessen time de-
mands on the judiciary, both at trial and in reviewing testimony
and reports.
If the incentive to overwhelm with experts is removed, so is
the unfair advantage garnered by the party with superior re-
sources. Although the wealthier party still could hire the more
expensive expert, the court-appointee's independent knowledge
would temper that expert's influence. Even if the parties contin-
ued to present numerous experts, the impartial expert could
help the fact finder to discard cumulative or peripheral testimo-
ny
119. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note ("The ever-present possibility
that the judge may appoint an expert in a given case must inevitably exert a sober-
ing effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the person utilizing his servic-
es."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D § 21.51 (1986) [hereinafter MCL 2D]
("[Clourt-appointed experts may have 'a great tranquilizing effect' on the other ex-
perts.").
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The alienation from the expert testimony system which many
professionals experience as a result of expert shopping also
would be ameliorated. 2 ° The "hired gun" aspect of service
would be eliminated when serving the court directly As a court-
appointee, a premium would be placed on credentials and impar-
tiality, rather than on viewpoint or bias. As the incentive to
mislead the court is reduced, professionals unwilling to serve
previously as partisan experts might perceive less potential for
reputational harm, thus raising the quality of partisan expert
testimony 121
History of Court-Appointed Experts
Court appointment of experts is not a new idea. Almost a
century ago, Judge Learned Hand recommended "a board of
experts or a single expert, not called by either side who shall
advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the case
which lie within his province."'22 Professor Wigmore posited
that the "remedy seems to lie in removing this partisan
feature."'23 To remove the partisan feature, Wigmore consid-
ered special juries of experts and the calling of only official im-
partial experts, but rejected these proposals as undesirable in-
terference with "the entrenched right of the parties to adduce
such evidence as they think useful""24 and as probably an un-
constitutional abrogation of jury right."25 He settled upon a
compromise remedy which would authorize the judge to select
an expert to testify in addition to those experts called by the
parties.
The common law origins of impartial experts run deep. The
first known references to court experts are from the fourteenth
century, when, in an action for mayhem, surgeons were sum-
moned to determine if a wound was fresh. 2 ' The use of impar-
120. See Van Dusen, supra note 15, at 512.
121. See infra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing the experience of the
New York Project with regard to the high quality of experts willing to serve and the
notion that service might come to be seen as an honor or a civic duty).
122. Hand, supra note 50, at 56.
123. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 563, at 762.
124. Id. at 762-63.
125. Id. at 762 n.3.
126. Anonymous, Lib. Ass'n 28, pl. 5 (28 Edward II) (1345), cited in Hart v. Com-
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tial experts to advise the trier of fact thus predates the use of
witnesses altogether, which were not used until well into the
fifteenth century 12
7
In many civil law jurisdictions, most notably Continental
Europe, this tradition persists. 2  Rather than using an ad-
versarial system of civil procedure, the Continental system is
predicated upon judges having responsibility for the examination
of witnesses,12 as well as the appropriation of expert opimon,
where needed.' One author has suggested that this model
would represent a vast improvement over the "incentives to dis-
tort evidence and the expense and complexity" which are
present in the Anglo-American tradition. ''
Judiczal Authority to Appoint Experts
Courts have both statutory and common law authority to
appoint their own experts. Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence3 2 allows courts to appoint impartial experts, sua
munity Sch. Bd., 383 F Supp. 699, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
127. Hand, supra note 50, at 44 ("It is common learning to-day that originally and
indeed for many years the jury had no witnesses present before them at all
Not until the middle of the fifteenth century was even the practice of summoning
witnesses well settled as an incident to the trial ")
128. Langbem, supra note 35, at 828-29.
129. Id. at 828; see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 23-26 (1975); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 380-81 (1982) (characterizing the English and American systems
of justice as adversarial and the West German and French systems of justice as
inquisitorial).
130. Langbem, supra note 35, at 829.
131. Id. at 823.
132. Rule 706 reads as follows:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion
of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should
not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations.
The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties,
and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness
shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A
witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court
m writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a confer-
ence in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness
so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the
witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be
called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject
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sponte or on the motion of a party ' Many states have analo-
gous provisions in their evidence codes."' Even in those states
which have not granted statutory authority to courts to call
impartial experts, such authority probably exists at common law 13
to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to rea-
sonable compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compen-
sation thus fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by law in
criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings
the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at
such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as
other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the
court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court
appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the
parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
FED. R. EViD. 706.
133. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
134. ALASKA R. EVID. 706 (1979); ARIz. R. EVID. 706 (1977); ARK. STAT. § 28-1001,
Rule 706 (1976); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 730-733 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994); COLO. R.
EvID. 706 (1979); LA. CODE OF EVID. art. 706 (1988); ME. R. EVID. 706 (1976); MICH.
R. EVID. 706 (1978); MINN. R. EVID. 706 (1977); MiSS. R. EVID. 706 (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-706, R. 706 (1975); N.M. STAT. § 20-4-706 (1973); N.D. R. EVID. 706
(1977); R.I. 'R. EVID. 706 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-15-9 to 19-15-19
(1979); VT. R. EVID. 706 (1982); WASH. R. EVID. 706 (1979); W. VA. R. EVID. 706
(1985); Wis. STAT. § 907.06 (1974); WYO. R. EVID. 706 (1978); UNIF. RULE OF EVI-
DENCE 706 (1974) (compiled in 2 WIGMORE, supra note 37, § 563).
135. "The inherent power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing
is virtually unquestioned." FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note. "No case
has been discovered in which it was held that a court does not have the power and
right to select an impartial expert witness " R.E. Barber, Annotation, Trial
Court's Appointment in Civil Case of Expert Witness, 95 A.L.R.2d 391, 392 (1964).
In Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), a court-appointed auditor was used
to make a preliminary investigation of facts, hear witnesses, and examine the
parties' accounts in connection with an alleged breach of a complex contract. The
Court held that appointment of the auditor was within the lower court's "inherent
power to provide [itself] with appropriate instruments required for the performance
of [its] duties." Id. at 312. Peterson is frequently cited as authority for court-appoint-
ed experts. See, e.g., Sink, supra note 16, at 206; see also In re Shell Oil Appraisal,
607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (holding that even though there is no Rule 706 in
the State of Delaware, the "spirit and purpose" of the Federal Rules of Evidence are
within the power of Delaware courts).
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Pattern of Disuse of Rule 706 to Appoint Experts
Despite the difficulties that the use of partisan expert testimo-
ny causes in the adjudication process, the long line of commenta-
tors espousing the use of court-appointed experts as the cure for
these problems, and the clearly established power of courts to
appoint experts of their own choosing, courts have been reluc-
tant to use impartial experts.'
A recent empirical study of the use of Rule 706 experts sur-
veyed 537 federal district judges.137 The survey asked judges
how often they had invoked the rule and appointed an impartial
expert.'38 Of the 431 respondents, only twenty percent (eighty-
six judges) stated that they had ever invoked the procedure at
all, and more than half of those eighty-six judges had used an
impartial expert only once. 139 The surveyors conducted tele-
phone interviews with sixty-eight of the eighty-six judges who
had appointed experts, and found that "experts were appointed
when there was either a thorough disagreement among parties'
experts over interpretation of technical evidence, or when
the judge perceived an extraordinary need to protect inors or
the public health."40
One reason that Rule 706 is desuetude is that judges and
lawyers do not know that it emsts.' At the very least, use of
the rule to resolve problems resulting from conflicting expert
testimony does not occur to the court or counsel in sufficient
time to appoint an impartial expert. The unfamiliarity of the
federal judiciary with Rule 706 is manifested by the fact that
136. See 3 JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 706-13
(1985) (noting that there are "remarkably few cases in which federal judges have ap-
pointed experts").
137. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Ex-
perts, FED. JUD. CTR. DIRECTIONS #4, at 6, 9 (Aug. 1992).
138. Id. at 6.
139. Id. Forty-five judges had appointed an expert once, 31 judges between two and
four times, six judges between five and nine times, three judges between 10 and 19
times, and one judge had appointed an impartial expert on more than 20 occasions.
Id. at 7.
140. Id. at 7-8.
141. Gross, supra note 35, at 1197 (ascribing the non-use by the judiciary of a Los
Angeles-area impartial expert testimony plan to "ignorance") (citing Note, The Doctor
in Court: Impartial Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 728, 734-35 (1967)).
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appellate courts have on several occasions seen fit to alert the
lower court to this option on remand.'
Trial Lawyers' Objectins to Court-Appointed Experts
Judicial disuse of Rule 706 can also be explained by the antip-
athy which many trial lawyers feel for the impartial expert. One
trial attorney called court-appointed experts "almost cominmums-
tic" and exhorted his fellow members of the bar to "cling with
liberty-loving, jealous, loyalty to our system."' Many courts
might depend on the parties themselves to move for the appoint-
ment of an expert but, given trial lawyers' predisposition against
impartial experts, such a motion is not likely to be forthcom-
ing.'
The trial bar's objections to the use of impartial experts re-
volve in large part around the implications which that practice
has for the adversarial system.45 The court's appointment of
its own expert witness injects the decisionmaker into the pro-
cess, a factor antithetical to traditional Anglo-American notions
of adversarial justice.
Trial lawyers see an impartial expert as infringing on their
prerogatives. 46 The removal of even a modicum of control over
witnesses to be heard will not sit well with the lawyer who sees
himself as "the principal actor[] in the drama of a trial"14 7 and
who prides himself on his ability to do his job of controlling and
influencing fact finders better than his peers.148 Even though
142. See, e.g., Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th Cir. 1977) (remanding to
the trial court an action by a prisoner for damages for violation of her civil rights
and noting "that Rule 706(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence confers on a district
court the discretionary power to appoint an expert witness"); Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 1000 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanding to the
district court and stating "that the District Court has the discretion to call an ex-
pert witness on its own" and "that the jury might benefit from the testimony of a
neutral expert in this case").
143. Howard K. Berry, Impartial Medical Testimony, 32 F.R.D. 481, 545 (1962).
144. Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 12.
145. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
146. MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.5.
147. FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, DAY IN COURT, OR THE SUBTLE ARTS OF GREAT ADVO-
CATES 6 (1910).
148. Trial lawyer Berry states, "[hiow can an advocate, who has a passable pride
in his advocacy, ever subscribe to this plan to stifle his art, and, in a way, subvert
1270
IMPARTIAL EXPERTS IN VALUATIONS
trial lawyers may be hurt more by their opponent's experts than
helped by their own, they don't want to cede control of the trial.
According to Professor Gross, "They may not win, but they want
to play ,,4
In addition, the trial bar might be opposed to impartial ex-
perts simply as a means of self-preservation. Trial lawyer
Melvin Belli once stated, in typically self-deprecating fashion,
that twenty-five percent of success in the courtroom is due to the
lawyer, and that "the other seventy-five percent depends on the
facts."5 0 In other words, there is only so much value that a
lawyer can add, and the appointment of an impartial expert
whittles the trial lawyer's contribution down even further.
Trial lawyers' commitment to the adversary process is also
perhaps explainable by the notion of procedural justice, a term
coined by climcal psychologists John Thibaut and Laurens Walk-
er in an effort to explain how participants in the legal system
come to regard legal outcomes as just.'' Thibaut and Walker
argue that the judicial procedures most likely to be perceived as
just are those that allow the maximum participation of the "dis-
putants," and the least input from the "decision maker."'52
They state that the Anglo-American adversarial system, as com-
pared, for instance, to an inquisitorial system, distributes more
control to disputants, and thus provides a superior procedure for
achieving results which disputants perceive as just.'
his ethics?" Berry, supra note 143, at 544. Trial lawyers have long been known to
have egos of legendary proportions. Ninety years ago, trial lawyer Francis Wellman
explained that an effective advocate must have a "healthy frame capable of enduring
the long-continued exertion of mind and body," WELLMAN, supra note 147, at 25, "a
voice that 'reaches the real melody of a song,' " id. at 26, a "marked physical attrac-
tion or personal magnetism," id. at 28, as well as "[p]erception, keenness of observa-
tion, clearness and quickness of comprehension," id. at 33.
149. Gross, supra note 35, at 1200.
150. RICHARD H. LUCAS & M. BYRON McCoy, THE WINNING EDGE: EFFECTIVE COM-
MUNICATION AND PERSUASION TECHNIQUES FOR LAWYERS xi (1993).
151. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDUR-
AL JUSTICE 5 (1988) ("[lIt was Thibaut and Walker who combined the study of pro-
cess with an interest in the psychology of justice to initiate the study of procedural
justice.").
152. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 129, at 1-2.
153. Id. at 118-24. "[Tlhe [adversary] procedure has been judged fairest and most
trustworthy both by persons subject to litigation and by those observing the proceed-
ings. Moreover, the adversary procedure produces greater satisfaction with the judg-
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Trial lawyers also argue that impartial experts "acquire an
aura of infallibility to which they are not entitled.""4 Trial
lawyers believe that if a jury learns that an expert is a court-
appointee it will accord the opinion of that expert undue defer-
ence, and "[e]ven when his appointment is not expressly dis-
closed, the absence of apparent bias will increase the appearance
of objectivity, competence, and accuracy"155 An empirical study
of the use of impartial experts appears to confirm trial lawyers'
worst fears-in fifty-eight cases in which experts were used, only
two were decided contrary to the advice of the expert.156
A further difficulty for trial lawyers lies in the difficulty of
cross-exannmng an impartial expert because he "is cloaked with
the protection of the court's robe,"'57 thus making impeach-
ment for bias or partisan motive nearly impossible. This danger
is magnified by the possibility that an impartial witness might
be co-opted by one of the parties during cross-examination and,
through the skillful use of leading questions, mislead the
jury 158
It is also argued in this regard that there is no such thing as
an impartial expert.' Most professional people have precon-
ceived notions and biases that influence the decisions they make
in their professional capacity For instance, there are often situ-
ment, regardless of the outcome " Id. at 118. Compare Francis Wellman's bald
statement that "tihere are no methods for ascertaining truth that are superior
to those in vogue in the English and American courts." WELLMAN, supra note 147,
at 6.
154. FED. R. EviD. 706 advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
155. Theodore I. Botter, The Court-Appointed Impartial Expert, in USING EXPERTS
IN CIVIL CASES 53, 62 (Melvin Kraft ed., 1982).
156. Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 14.
157. Botter, supra note 155, at 60. Judge Botter quotes a "skilled New York attor-
ney" as asking, "[w]ill the law stand by and allow its anointed pillar of light to
be overthrown by cross-examination?" Id. (citation omitted).
158. See Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 66 n.277.
159. See Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES OF CRIM. PSY-
CHODYNAMICS 221 (1959), cited in RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE 979-83 (1983) (arguing that court-appointed psyclu-
atrists in criminal cases are inherently biased in that they are usually chosen from
the same group of psychologists, are self-selecting, and because the district attorney
has undue influence over the courts in psychiatrist selection); Berry, supra note 143,
at 543 ("There just ain't no impartial [experts] because there ain't no impartial peo-
ple!").
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ations in technical professions in which there is more than one
legitimate school of thought to which a professional nght sub-
scribe. In the case of a court-appointed expert, then, this poses a
special threat, in that "the appointment may tend to predeter-
mine the outcome of the case." 60
Tral lawyers additionally argue that widespread use of court-
appointed experts will effectively preclude many valid claims by
making it impossible for plaintiffs to win certain actions. At the
congressional hearings on the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence held in 1973, a representative of the Association of
Trial Lawyers argued that adoption of Rule 706 would "literally
obliterate" future medical malpractice claims.' 6' Noting the re-
luctance of local doctors to testify against one another, he ar-
gued that court appointment of a local doctor would require the
plaintiff to hire his expert from outside the community 162
Meanwhile, the court-appointee in all likelihood would be a
member of the community and biased toward the local doctor, as
well as better known to the fact finder.6 '
Finally, the above objections implicate the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial." The opimon of the impartial ex-
pert may carry such weight with the jury that the expert's ap-
160. MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.5.
161. Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., ist Sess.
296-97, 308 (1973) (comments of James F Schaeffer, Chairman of the ATLA's Com-
mittee on Federal Evidence and Procedure).
162. Id.
163. Id. The claims contemplated by this Note, however, are not of the medical
malpractice variety, but rather are routine valuation actions m specialty courts such
as the U.S. Tax Court and Delaware Court of Chancery. See infra notes 191-246 and
accompanying text (discussing specialty fora and the valuation dilemma). Arguments
such as those put forward by the ATLA would have less relevance in this context,
in that there is no jury right in any of these specialty jurisdictions, the courts are
national in nature, and the impartial experts testifying before these courts are likely
to be drawn from all over the country.
164. The Seventh Amendment reads as follows:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the Unit-
ed States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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pointment would be tantamount to the appointment of a special
purpose fact finder.'
Judicial Reluctance to Appoint Experts
In addition to the many valid objections of the trial bar, judg-
es perceive several shortcoimngs with court-appointed experts
that help to explain why courts are reluctant to use nonpartisan
experts. These shortcomings revolve in large part around the
complex and expensive procedures required to effectuate the
appointment of an expert.
The appointment of a neutral expert is a time-consuming
process, particularly for a judiciary whose resources are already
strained.' The trial judge who wants to appoint sua sponte
his own expert not only must undertake a complex appointment
procedure,"' but at trial has to contend with the testimony,
expert report, and cross-examination by both parties of yet an-
other witness. Thus one trial judge, in denying a party request
for an impartial expert, held that "additional experts would not
serve to elucidate, clarify, or enlighten , but instead would
add more divergence and opinion differences in a cumulative
manner."'
68
165. See MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.5; Elwood S. Levy, Impartial Medical Testi-
mony-Revtsited, 34 TEMPLE L.Q. 416, 425 (1961) ("[Tlral by jury becomes no
more than an empty illusion "); Saltzburg, supra note 24, at 78.
166. If the judiciary lacks the wherewithal to administer the appointment of an
impartial expert, an obvious solution is the devotion of additional resources, staff
and judges to the judiciary. This costs money, however, and it also raises constitu-
tional problems. "A substantial increase in the judiciary could make democratic
control over judges even less effective than it is today." John C. Reitz, Why We
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV.
987, 998 (1990) (commenting on the German system, in which judges are required to
take on many of the tasks which the American system assigns to the parties).
One commentator has characterized the claim of lack of resources as "sheer
unwillingness to devote the time and money necessary for selecting experts and
overseeing the taking of their testimony," which he describes as "a product of bu-
reaucratic mentality-in a bureaucracy it is always safer to do nothing than to stick
your neck out." Lee, supra note 12, at 499. But see infra notes 276-82 (describing
the New York Project, which recounts the cost savings that can be realized through
the appointment of expert witnesses).
167. See tnfra notes 249-60 and accompanying text (outlining the appointment pro-
cess).
168. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 328, 334 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See
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Compounding the difficulty of appointment is the likelihood
that the judge, unless she is among the one in five who has
appointed an expert before," 9 is unfamiliar with the process.
Rule 706 gives the trial judge little or no guidance on how to
deal with many practical considerations, "such as how to identify
the need for a Rule 706 expert, how to shape pretrial procedures
to reduce conflicts between experts for the parties, and how to
reduce interference with the adversarial process "170
In addition to appointing an expert, a judge must devise some
means of compensating the expert. Rule 706(b) allows for public
funding of impartial experts in criminal cases and takings ac-
tions. In all other proceedings, compensation shall be paid "as
the court directs."'7 ' Practically speaking, it is difficult to make
a party pay for an expert who may well have testified in favor of
its opponent. 72 For such a recalcitrant litigant, the judge
would have to formally order payment and hold a show-cause
hearing, which could result in considerable delay of payment to
the court-appointee. 71 Many commentators have suggested
that the fee of the impartial expert be taxed to the losing party
as costs, 74 but this would require even further delay The ex-
pert would have to wait until the trial judge's final decision for
payment.75 Judges have indicated that the uncertainty sur-
supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the Georgia-Pacific case).
169. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (discussing an empirical study
of judicial use of Rule 706).
170. THOMAS WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS 1-2 (1986).
171. FED. R. EVID. 706(b).
172. Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 11.
173. Id. Where the expert is discharged before the case is resolved, the order and
hearing would have to interrupt the proceeding, or the payment would have to be
yet further delayed. Id.
174. Lee, supra note 12, at 494 n.50 (citing Van Dusen, supra note 15, at 503, 505;
Sink, supra note 16, at 210).
175. Delay in the court system has become notorious. For the impartial expert, who
has in all likelihood been employed since the earliest pretrial hearing, this delay can
mean a protracted period of time between when he renders his service and when he
receives payment for that service. A recent study indicates that, on the average, only
about 60% of civil cases filed in federal district court are terminated within one
year. TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 46 (1990). In the U.S. Tax Court, it takes one
year to get to trial and at least another year, often longer, after the final briefs are
filed, to get an opinion issued. Claudia MacLachlan, The Tax Bench. A Code Apart,
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rounding the administration of an impartial expert's compensa-
tion "can tip the balance against appointment."'1
While lack of resources and unfamiliarity with the process
work in part to explain why judges do not appoint experts, there
is also a systenc bias against appointment. The American legal
culture tends to view the judge as passive, as compared to the
Continental tradition in which the judge is intimately involved
in the proceedings from pleadings to final decision.'7 7 The ap-
pointment of an expert entails substantial involvement by the
judge in the adjudicative process. Many judges committed to the
adversary system are reluctant to take such a high level of
involvement.' 8 In addition, much of the judiciary is comprised
of former trial lawyers who, as outlined above, are generally
biased against the use of court-appointed experts.1'9 For other
judges, the resistance to court appointments is a matter of style.
Many judges take an aloof attitude toward the trial process,
viewing themselves as referees between the litigants during trial
and relying on the evidentiary process and the competence of the
parties in direct and cross-examination to elicit the relevant
information. 8 '
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at 1, 51.
176. Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 11.
177. Reitz, supra note 166, at 992; see also supra note 128 and accompanying text
(describing civil law jurisdictions); Botter, supra note 155, at 78-79 ([O]ur traditions
of adversarial control and judicial restraint militate against judicial intervention.").
178. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 8 ("The non-appointing judges seemed
to differ from the appointing ones primarily in the extent to which they were willing
to stand by the adversarial system, even when it was failing to provide information
necessary to resolve the dispute.").
179. Gross, supra note 35, at 1198 ("[Mlost judges are former trial lawyers and
share some of the outlook of their past colleagues."). A survey of appointments to
the federal judiciary by the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Admmistra-
tions reveals that approximately 40% of the federal judiciary served as prosecutors
prior to their appointment. This figure, of course, does not include those judges who
litigated only in private practice or who represented the government in a civil capac-
ity. Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recruitment, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 195-98 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
180. For discussions of managerial judging versus passive judging, see Saltzburg,
supra note 24, at 7-10, and Resnik, supra note 129, at 417-24. Related to this dis-
cussion is the always controversial issue of what the proper role of a trial court
should be-either seeker of truth or dispute resolution device. See, e.g., Peter Huber,
A Comment on Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence by E. Donald Elliott, 69 B.U. L. REV. 513, 513 (1989) (quoting an
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Judges also might be unwilling to appoint impartial experts
because of an in-bred skepticism of techmcal expertise. Professor
Gross has written, "[t]here is a strain in American case law of
distrust, if not hostility, to scientific authority "' He cites as
the worst example of this distrust Barefoot v.. Estelle,"' in
which the Supreme Court disregarded warmngs of the American
Psychiatric Association as to the inaccuracy of psychiatric pre-
dictions of dangerousness in capital sentencing hearings.'83
Such a result does not seem unusual, given a judiciary imbued
with the notion that, through the application of generic princi-
ples of law, a just resolution results regardless of the technical
complexity of the issues."
A final explanation of judicial reticence to appoint experts
might be judicial fear of reversal on appeal. Rule 706's procedure
is not widely used. It is settled that a court cannot be reversed
for failure to appoint a Rule 706 expert, even upon the motion of
one of the parties. 8 These two facts might lead a judge to con-
unspecified "great Justice" as saying that "[ilt is sometimes more important that
things be settled than that they be settled right"); cf Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) ("Federal judges are not referees at
prize-fights but functionaries of justice. As such, they have a duty of initiative to see
that the issues are determined within the scope of the pleadings ") (citation
omitted).
181. Gross, supra note 35, at 1123 n.36.
182. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
183. Gross, supra note 35, at 1123 n.36.
184. For a generalist judge to engage in specialized and sophisticated scientific and
economic analysis might be regarded as something of a "loser's game." That is, the
risks of being wrong far outweigh the gain from being right, and it is a much safer
proposition to decide such issues by recourse to general principles of law. See
Areeda, supra note 10, at 1043 (stating that judges who engage in non-legal analysis
may be regarded "condescendingly, for errors will sometimes occur in transmission).
185. See Oklahoma Natural Gas v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 786 F.2d 1004, 1007
(10th Cir.) ("[T]he district court was in no way obligated to appoint an expert in
this case and its failure to do so cannot give rise to error."), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
853 (1986); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that ap-
pointment is within the trial judge's discretion); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States, 640 F.2d 328, 334 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("[D]ivergence of opinions among the experts
of the parties does not require that the court appoint experts to assist it in resolv-
ing such conflicts."); Man v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Mich.
1980) ("The matters raised herein are not amenable only to expertise, but are within
the comprehension of laypersons. The presence of a court-sponsored witness would
most certainly create a strong, if not overwhelming, impression of 'impartiality' and
'objectivity ' .).
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elude that the probability of being reversed on appeal is high
and that an expert appointment is more trouble than it is worth.
Any fear which a trial judge has of being overturned solely
because of the appointment of an impartial expert, however, is
unfounded. As the discretion to refuse to appoint an expert re-
sides in the trial judge, so does the discretion to choose to ap-
point an expert.' Federal courts have the authority, both in-
herent and rule-given, to appoint impartial experts.'87 In addi-
tion, courts enjoy broad discretion as to this power of appoint-
ment. 8' Finally, appointments of neutral experts are review-
able only for abuse of that discretion." 9 The abuse of discretion
standard is lenient. As an example of this lemency, the techmcal
advisor appointments in Reilly and United Shoe, which permit-
ted the court to engage in communication without the parties
present and included no right of cross-examination, were upheld
under similar standards. 90
SPECIALTY FORA AND THE VALUATION DILEMMA
This Part of the Note will argue that the practical and theo-
retical difficulties which give rise to the disuse of impartial ex-
perts can be addressed by certain unique characteristics of three
specialty jurisdictions: the United States Tax Court,'9 ' the
186. Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1962); Dresser Indus.
v. Ford Motor Co., 530 F Supp. 303, 313 n.14 (1981); Hart v. Community Sch. Bd.,
383 F Supp. 699, 762-64 (1974).
187. Scott, 298 F.2d at 930; Dresser Indus., 530 F Supp. at 313 n.14; Hart, 383 F
Supp. at 762-64.
188. United States v. Michigan, 680 F Supp. 928, 987 (W.D. Mich. 1987); see also
Dresser Indus., 530 F Supp. at 313 ("[Ilt is within the Court's discretion to obtain
an advisory opinion from the Patent Office where it will likely contribute to the
avoidance of unnecessary duplication of effort, expense and delay.").
189. Students of Cal. Sch. for the Blind v. Homg, 736 F.2d 538, 549 (9th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 148 (1985). The question of the expert's
qualifications is also within the "sound discretion of the trial judge." Id.
190. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the
district court acted within its discretion in the use of an expert); see also supra
notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
191. The Tax Court's jurisdiction is defined by the following rules and statutes: Tax
Court Rule 13 (deficiency jurisdiction); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213-6214 (1988) (tax deficiency);
id. § 7428 (qualified status of exempt organizations); id. § 7476 (qualification of
retirement plans); id. § 7478 (tax exempt status of state and mumcipal bonds).
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United States Court of Federal Claims,"' and the Delaware
Chancery Court."9 Many high stakes valuation actions are
tried in these three fora in connection with tax claims, takings
actions, shareholder disputes, and similar claims.9 While
these courts are considered expert in their respective jurisdic-
tions, each has lamented its frustration in deciding valuation
issues based solely on the testimony of partisan experts. Judge
Tannenbaum of the Tax Court, for instance, has spoken against
the "Solomon-like adjustment" of the split difference. 9 ' Claims
Court Judge David Schwartz spoke of his "uneasy doubt as to an
appropriate discount for partisanship." '
Recently, Justice Walsh of the Delaware Supreme Court, in
affirming the Chancery Court's valuation determination in a
major shareholder appraisal, took "the occasion to comment
upon a recurring theme in recent appraisal cases-the clash of
192. See Strom Thurmond, United States Claims Court Symposium: Introduction, 40
CATH. U. L. REv. 513, 514 (1991) (stating that the court has nationwide jurisdiction
over a broad range of nontort actions against the federal government, including
contracts cases, tax disputes, takings actions, clans by Native Americans, suits by
military and civil service personnel, patent infringement cases, and childhood vaccine
compensation); infra note 230.
193. Delaware's Court of Chancery has "jurisdiction to hear and determine all mat-
ters and causes in equity," including equitable claims against corporations domiciled
in Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1974).
194. A survey of reported decisions for calendar year 1992, conducted for the pur-
poses of this Note, indicates the following for each of the three specialty jurisdic-
tions:
In 1992, the U.S. Tax Court reported 821 decisions, either in the official Tax
Court Reporter or as unpublished "memorandum opimons." In 57 of these cases,
representing 6.9% of total reported decisions, partisan expert testimony was heard
with regard to a valuation issue.
In 1992, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims reported 277 decisions. In 16 of
these cases, the court heard testimony from partisan experts, and in four of these
cases, representing 1.4% of all cases reported, the expert testimony bore on a valua-
tion issue. Of the four valuation claims, three were takings actions and the other
was a Native American claim. These figures do not include those claims made pur-
suant to the Vaccine Compensation Amendments of 1987, 46 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c),
which are referred to a special master.
In 1992, the Delaware Chancery Court reported 190 decisions. Six of these
decisions, representing 3.2% of reported cases, involved valuation determinations
made with reference to partisan expert testimony. Only one of these cases was pub-
lished m an official reporter.
195. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value."'97
Justice Walsh continued:
The presentation of widely divergent views reflecting parti-
san positions in appraisal proceedings adds to the burden of
the Court of Chancery's task of fixing value. Such extremes
may result in the court's rejection of both opinions in favor of
a middle position [I]f the court is limited to the biased
presentation of the parties, it is often forced to pick and
choose from a limited record without the benefit of objective
analysis and opinion. 9'
Justice Walsh concluded by exhorting the Chancery Court to
consider the use of court-appointed experts when making com-
plex appraisal determinations.199
Authority of the Specialty Jurisdictions to Appoint Experts
The Delaware Chancery Court,00 the U.S. Tax Court," 1
197. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992); see also
Anne C. Foster, The Court's Own Expert Valuation Witness in Delaware, P-H LAW
AND BUSINESS INSIGHTS, Aug. 1992, at 30 (analyzing the Shell Oil decision and hy-
pothesizing that its impact on future proceedings may be to encourage greater objec-
tivity in expert analysis as a means of deterring a court from appointing its own ex-
perts).
198. Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1222.
199. Id. at 1223. Shell Oil concerned an appraisal action brought by minority
shareholders following the cash-out merger of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company with
its American subsidiary, Shell Oil. The Chancellor, in his attempt to value plaintiff
shareholders' stock, heard from experts who opined that the shares were worth as
little as $43 and as much as $143. Id. at 1216-17. The Chancery Court eventually
valued plaintiffs stock at $71.20 per share. Id. at 1218.
The Chancellor found the most convincing testimony to be that of one of the
plaintiffs' experts who valued the stock at $89, to which the court then applied a
20% discount. He did not explain his choice of discount factor, but it seems worth
noting in this regard that the $71 figure basically "splits the difference" between
$43--defendant Shell's lowest estimate-and $143-the high end of the plaintiffs' so-
called present value of equity analysis. Id. at 1216-17.
The court also found compelling the analysis from one of defendant's experts
valuing the stock at $57.50. Id. at 1218. This is particularly interesting given that
the split difference between $57.50 and the plaintiffs' best estimate of $89 is $73.25,
a scant two dollars richer than the Chancellor's own estimate.
200. The Chancery Court rules contain no parallel to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Id. at 1222. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that "even in the
absence of a parallel federal rule, the spirit and purpose of the federal rules have
always been within the inherent power of our courts." Id.
201. Tax Court Rule 143(a) provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to
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and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 2 have the authority to
appoint their own experts. None of these fora have as yet made
use of this authority2. 3 While the judges sitting on these
courts and the lawyers arguing before them no doubt take as
dim a view of impartial experts as their brethren in the courts of
general jurisdiction, there are certain characteristics of these
three fora that make them especially well designed to cope with
the theoretical and practical questions raised by the use of im-
partial experts.
Trial Lawyers' Objections to Court-Apponted Experts
The numerous criticisms levelled at impartial experts by trial
lawyers can largely be answered by the fact that there is no jury
right in either the Claims Court, the Tax Court, or the Chancery
Court.0 4 Judges in each of the courts are highly specialized in
their knowledge and abilities and have heard numerous valua-
tion cases.0 5 In this light, the trial lawyers' fear of abrogation
of jury right0 6 is entirely inapplicable, and the "aura of infal-
U.S. Tax Court proceedings, to the extent that those Rules apply to trials without a
jury in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
202. The Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable to the Court of Federal Claims.
FED. R. EVID. 1101(a). But see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 328,
334 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (recognizing authority to appoint an impartial expert but declining
to do so).
203. See Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1222 ("Apparently, no Delaware Court has ever
appointed a neutral expert witness upon its own initiative."); see also Roger A. Pies
& David J. Fischer, Why Not Court Appointed Experts?, TAX NOTES, July 18, 1988,
at 306 (finding "no decided Tax Court case in which the Tax Court has exercised its
authority and appointed its own expert"). But see Holland v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d
675 (6th Cir. 1987) (complaining that the Tax Court did not appoint a Rule 706 ex-
pert).
A computer search for references in the case law of each of these fora to Rule
706, impartial experts, or court-appointed experts confirms that in no reported deci-
sion has a judge in one of these three fora appointed his own expert.
204. The Tax Court and Court of Federal Claims are Article I courts, established
by act of Congress, and thus the constitutional jury right does not apply. See infra
note 231 and accompanying text. The Chancery Court is a court of equity, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1974), and, as such, all cases are tried before chancellors
only.
205. See supra note 194 (noting the number of valuation claims heard by special
courts).
206. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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libility" °7 and impeachment.. concerns become considerably
less pressing. While these dangers might be considered to be
present in a bench trial, a judge is a more discriminating listen-
er and would be aware of the limitations of the examination
process. More importantly, in a bench trial the judge is obligated
to state specifically all of his findings of fact and conclusions of
law, whereas a jury can simply render a verdict without any
explanation."°9
The judges in the specialty jurisdictions are themselves spe-
cialists. Most of the judges in the Tax Court are former members
of the tax bar, revenue agents, or staff members of congressional
committees dealing with tax issues,210 and Delaware's chancel-
lors are similarly well recognized experts in the field of corpora-
tion law 21 Judges of general jurisdiction, in contrast, have
widely vaned caseloads and expertise.
Procedural safeguards can address any inherent bias of im-
partial experts."2 Rather than testifying as to the actual dollar
value of property in issue, an impartial expert could simply
serve as a guide for the court. She could critique the methodolo-
gy of the partisan experts and prepare a report on the partisan
experts' opinions which the court could use in reaching its own
conclusion as to findings of fact." 3
At common law, experts could not testify as to their opimon
on an "ultimate issue" to be decided by the trier of fact. " 4 The
207. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7459(b) (1988) (requiring the Tax Court judge to specifi-
cally list findings of fact); FED. R. Civ. P 52(a).
210. See Claudia MacLachlan, The Players on the Tax Court Bench, NATL L.J.,
Sept. 27, 1993, at 50 (finding that of the 19 judges on the U.S. Tax Court, all are
tax specialists: eight have both government and private practice experience; six have
only private practice experience; three were at the Internal Revenue Service; and
two were congressional staffers).
211. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puz-
zle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 277 (1985) ("[Tlhe continuity in and small size of
Delaware's chancery court, which hears corporation law cases, while facilitating the
development of judicial expertise in the field, also makes Delaware decisions more
predictable than those of other states "); see also infra note 236.
212. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing inherent bias).
213. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text (discussing appointment proce-
dures and experts' duties).
214. See JOHN W STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 12, 14 (4th ed.
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Federal Rules reject this approach,21 largely because it is too
difficult to determine what an "ultimate issue" might be, and
because the rule usually works to deprive the trier of fact of
helpful information.21 In the valuation context, there does not
seem to be any such difficulty of definition-the ultimate issue is
the dollar value of the property in issue.
Even if specialty courts using impartial experts in valuation
cases do not choose to formally adopt an "ultimate issue" rule,
parties can still object that the probative value of an impartial
expert's dollar valuation is outweighed by the danger of poten-
tial prejudice to the fact finder.21 The parties can insist that a
prohibition on dollar valuations be included in the description of
duties which the judge provides the partisan expert before tri-
al.218
The arguments that impartial expert testimony threatens the
adversarial system are harder to answer, given that court-ap-
pointed experts are by definition nonadversarial. In the context
of expert testimony, it is in many respects the adversarial na-
ture of partisan experts that causes the problems that this Note
has described.
Professor Wigmore recognized many years ago that the remov-
al of the partisan factor was necessary to rectify the problems of
expert testimony 219 Removing partisanship always will entail
a loss to the adversarial process, but the appointment of court
experts, as compared to other solutions to the partisan expert
dilemma (notably technical advisors, special masters, and spe-
cial juries), poses a lesser threat to the adversarial system. Rule
706 allows for party input into the choice of expert, party over-
sight of judge/expert communications, and party examnnation of
the expert, thereby mitigating the appointment's threat to the
adversarial system. As the Federal Judicial Center's Manual for
1992).
215. FED. R. EviD. 704.
216. FED. R. EViD. 704 advisory committee's note.
217. FED. R. EviD. 403. There are also objections available under Rule 702 that the
expert's testimony may not be helpful to the trier of fact.
218. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text (outlining the appointment pro-
cess).
219. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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Complex Litigation states, "[u]se of court-appointed experts is
not a radical departure from the traditional adversary model for
litigation."20
Judicial Reluctance to Appoint Experts
Two of the reasons judges might be reticent to appoint impar-
tial experts can be dispensed with immediately First, as long as
abuse of discretion cannot be persuasively argued, there is no
reason to fear reversal.22' Second, given the fact that the judg-
es on the specialty courts are highly educated in the discrete
areas of the law in which they specialize, it seems unlikely that
they would suffer from the same distrust of scientific or techm-
cal authority as nght a judge of general junsdicton.22
Three other reasons for judicial disuse of the rule-ignorance,
unfamiliarity with process, and lack of resources-can be ad-
dressed through the development of standard operating proce-
dures for the appointment of impartial experts.
An easily implemented procedure used extensively, so as to
spread fixed start-up and learning curve costs over a large
enough caseload, could work to make the use of impartial ex-
perts more efficient than traditional (partisan expert only) litiga-
tion. Less deliberation and evaluation of nonpartisan testimony
would be required of the court.222 Widespread use of nonparti-
san experts also might result in an increased incidence of pretri-
al settlement, or at least a tendency of partisan experts to tone
down exaggeration of their client's claim,224 thereby making
220. MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.51
221. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing judges' distrust of
expert technical authority).
223. The expert would be available to guide the court through the voluminous and
conflicting testimony, rather than leaving the inexpert fact finder to decipher the
information itself. But see MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.51 ("Although court-ap-
pointed experts may facilitate settlements or concessions, the objective of such
an appointment is a more understandable trial, not a shorter one.").
224. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 532 F.2d 957, 1000
(5th Cir. 1976). "The mere presence of a neutral expert may have 'a great tran-
quilizing effect' on the experts retained by [the parties]." Id. (citing Judge E. Barrett
Prettyman, Proof of Scientific and Technical Facts, 21 F.R.D. 466, 469 (1957)); see
also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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the fact finder's job easier. Increased use of impartial experts
would have a salutary effect on the justice-seeking functions the
courts must perform, as well as enable the courts to become
more efficient in their handling of valuation claims.22 As this
Note argues below, the Delaware Chancery Court, the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims, and the U.S. Tax-Court each have
unique incentives, not shared by courts of general jurisdiction, to
develop standard operating procedures.
A specialty judge might be more interested in the develop-
ment of a procedure to handle valuation claims than would a
general judge, who sees claims of all types and whose profes-
sional concerns are likely to be more diverse. This is the first
step toward the appointment of experts pursuant to a standard
procedure and the court's realization of the economies of scale
possible with widespread utilization.
Each of the specialty courts tries enough valuation cases each
year22 that the fixed costs of the establishment and implemen-
tation of a standard procedure could be spread between numer-
ous separate actions, making the development of a standard
procedure more cost-effective than in a court of general jursdic-
tion.
Unlike a federal or state district court, the specialty courts are
highly centralized. While judges on the Claims Court and the
Tax Court will travel to accommodate petitioners in cities other
than Washington, D.C., the permanent chambers of the respec-
tive courts are kept together.2 7 This high degree of centraliza-
tion would facilitate the implementation of any standard proce-
dure, if only by word of mouth dissemination between the vari-
ous chambers.
225. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text (discussing how impartial ex-
perts can lead courts through complex factual determinations and ameliorate the
truth problems posed by partisan experts).
226. See supra note 194 (discussing the number of valuation decisions rendered).
227. The Tax Court and the Claims Court are located in Washington, D.C. While
the Chancery Court sits at three sites across Delaware: Wilmington, Dover and
Georgetown, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 301 (1974), the number of chancellors is
sufficiently limited to achieve a comparable degree of centralization, id. § 307 (Supp.
1992) (providing for the appointment of only one Chancellor and four Vice-
Chancellors).
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Another potential incentive to adopt a procedure for the ap-
pointment of experts can loosely be termed "forum competition."
Tax claims heard by the Tax Court, for instance, may be tried in
either federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims. Sim-
ilarly, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction
over claims for money against the federal government, 22' but
this exclusive jurisdiction is constantly being modified and
attrited by common law and statute.229 Throughout their rela-
tively brief histories, the very existence of the Claims Court and
the Tax Court has been threatened on numerous occasions."
They exist because of their expertise in discrete areas of the law,
but they were created by Congress, not Article III of the Consti-
tution, and exist only at the whim of statute.231 As specialty
fora, each of these courts subsist in large part on their expertise
\ to try special issues better than those courts with which they
share jurisdiction. Litigants, when trying a claim within the
specialty jurisdiction, generally can count on a more thorough
and professional hearing than in a court of general jurisdiction.
A feasible procedure for the appointment of expert witnesses
would combat the problems associated with partisan expert
testimony and augment the Tax Court's and Court of Federal
Claims' respective statuses as innovative and professional fora.
228. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988); see also United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1
(1888) (establishing that the jurisdiction of the Claims Court is to hear claims for
money against the United States).
229. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 69 (Apr. 2, 1990) (detailing a Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee proposal to vest near-exclusive jurisdiction for tax claims in the Tax Court);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the Crossroads, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 517
(1991) (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions which cut into Claims Court juris-
diction).
230. See David M. Cohen, Claims for Money in the Claims Court, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 533 (1991) (describing the evolving jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims);
Loren A. Smith, Claims Court Symposium: Foreword, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 509
(1991) (summarizing the history of the Court of Federal Claims, originally without
authority to render final judgments); see also Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489
(1943) (discussing the history of the Tax Court and establishing its legitimacy);
MacLachlan, supra note 175, at 50 (stating that fewer cases are being tried in the
Tax Court-in 1986, 84,007 cases were pending, and in 1993, about 40,000).
231. 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1988) (establishing the Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp.
IV 1992) (establishing the Court of Federal Claims).
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Forum competition is of a different nature in the Delaware
Chancery Court. The State of Delaware is the domicile of more
than half of America's 500 largest industrial firms. 32 This sta-
tus represents the culmination of a long battle among the states
to "steal" corporate chartering business, and the lucrative fran-
chise tax revenues that accompany such business, from one
another. 3 The State of Delaware has acted concertedly to
attract corporate chartering business,234 and the Delaware ju-
diciary, because of its close ties to the legislature, has worked to
effect this goal through its rulings.2 5
According to the "Interest Group Theory" of Delaware corpora-
tion law, the state's preemnnence in the business of corporate
chartering is the result of the state's reliable and professional
judiciary and the predictability provided by its well-developed
body of case law 23 The interest group analysis is the latest in
a line of explanations for Delaware's primacy in corporate char-
tering business237 and, for the time being, it seems to be the
most widely accepted.238 If it is correct, a premium on innova-
tion and predictability in the chartering competition would seem
232. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (1992).
233. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663-65 (1974) (outlining the history of liberal corporate law);
Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 709, 709 (1987) ("[Sitates compete to provide firms with corporate char-
tersf in order to obtain franchise tax revenues.").
234. Cary, supra note 233, at 668-69 (stating that franchise taxes accounted for
one-quarter of Delaware's total tax revenue in 1974); see also Romano, supra note
211, at 241-42 (discussing the powerful franchise tax incentives "that goad [Dela-
ware] to be responsive" to firms).
235. Cary, supra note 233, at 690-92.
236. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (arguing that Delaware is an
attractive state of incorporation because its judges are specialists in corporate law,
thus enabling the state to offer a stable, predictable, and sophisticated body of com-
mon law as well as enabling it to assert credibly that the law will remain stable).
237. Another explanation is Professor Cary's "race to the bottom" theory. See Cary,
supra note 233, at 684-86 (arguing that Delaware attracts corporate chartering busi-
ness because its laws favor management at the expense of shareholders).
238. Douglas M. Branson, Interdeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest
Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 90 (1990).
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to create an incentive for the establishment of procedures for the
regular appointment of experts.
Cultural Bias Toward the Adversary System
Although the unique characteristics and incentives of the
specialty fora work to counteract most of the shortcomings of
impartial expert testimony, the problem of the cultural bias of
trial lawyers and the judiciary toward the adversary system
persists. Given trial lawyers' disdain for impartial experts, and
the fact that choice of forum is in most cases the province of the
trial lawyer as advisor to the litigant, forum competition might
actually provide a disincentive to the establishment of proce-
dures for expert appointment. An argument also might be made
that the party with the weak case will opt for the less expert
forum.
Forum competition incentives, however, could play a role in
alleviating the cultural preference for the adversary system. In
the case of a shareholder appraisal action, the choice of forum is
to a large extent determined by the defendant corporation's
domicile. The people who make chartering decisions are not trial
lawyers, but corporate lawyers.. who, as counsel to boards of
directors, are naturally conservative,24 ° especially where litiga-
tion and contingent liabilities are concerned." ' Thus corporate
litigants in the Delaware Chancery Court might be willing to
cede some control over the litigation, and the rare chance to win
big in a valuation action, to the stability and predictability of
court-appointed experts.242
239. Romano, supra note 211, at 273.
240. For the corporate fiduciary, there is a systemic aversion to risk. Gains from
risky activity are distributed pro rata among shareholders/owners, while the losses
from risky activity are potentially borne by the fiduciary alone. See, e.g., Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 553-56 (1990) (dis-
cussing the incentives of institutional investors and their fiduciary role as deterring
activism).
241. See Macey & Miller, supra note 236, at 484. Considerations other than fidu-
ciary duty, such as lowering transaction costs and the cost of capital, also lead cor-
porate directors and their lawyers toward conservativism. See Romano, supra note
211, at 251 ("[Tihe additional expense of a Delaware domicile is analogous to an
insurance premium that reduces the risks of future transactions by providing more
certain outcomes.").
242. Romano, supra note 211, at 274 ("[Sltability and predictability are desired by
1288
IMPARTIAL EXPERTS IN VALUATIONS
In the case of the Tax Court and Court of Federal Claims, the
bias toward adversariness is mitigated by the fact that the re-
spondent (or defendant) will always be the federal government.
The law of averages dictates that in the long run the govern-
ment, unlike the occasional litigant, will be unable to profit from
the few decisional errors in its favor.
2 43
Even some private practitioners have argued that the Tax
Court should consider the appointment of impartial experts.2'
In certain types of valuation cases the Tax Court might be
forced to disallow petitioner's requested relief rather than split
the difference between the valuation testimony of petitioner's
and respondent's experts.245 The petitioner who has gone to
"great lengths to enlighten the Tax Court" would prefer that the
court make an educated judgment, rather than decide the case
"without coming to grips with the expert testimony 246
PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
The high cost and difficulty of appointment procedures is one
of the primary impediments to courts appointing experts. As
valuation actions are generally routine and short lived, a court
has less incentive to take the time to seek out its own ex-
pert.247 In order that the appointment of experts ceases to be
"the exception and not the rule"24 in valuation actions in the
three specialty fora, standard operating procedures for appoint-
ment, use, and compensation must be established. One of the
managers who need quick opimons on proposed activities.").
243. With hundreds of routine valuation claims being asserted on behalf of, and
against, the government annually, the government's incentive to seek out an inexpert
fact finder and hope for an occasional decisional error is lessened by the fact that
any lucky gain will be offset by future unlucky losses. See supra note 194 (discuss-
ing the large number of valuation cases in Claims Court and Tax Court).
244. Pies & Fischer, supra note 203, at 303.
245. Id. at 304. Pies and Fischer used an equipment leasing tax shelter as an
example. In a case of that type, the residual value assigned the equipment leased is
the heart of the matter: either it is high enough to qualify for the tax break or it is
not. Id.
246. Id. at 305.
247. See FED. R. CIv. P 16(c)(10) (indicating that "special procedures," presumably
including a court-appointed expert, should be reserved for "managing potentially
difficult or protracted actions").
248. MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.5, at 97.
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premises of this Note is that the Tax Court, Claims Court, and
Chancery Court are uniquely positioned because of their high
degrees of centralization and expertise and the large number of
valuation actions heard by each, to implement a standard oper-
ating procedure which would facilitate expert appointments.
The Appointment Process
The appointment procedure, outlined in Rule 706(a), clearly
anticipates that any appointment will be pretrial. 9 Early ap-
pointment enables the parties to have input into the appoint-
ment process, and helps the court to seek out the best-qualified
expert available.25
The court must determine first that a neutral expert will be
useful.25 Thus the court must make a preliminary deternna-
tion of the factual issues to be decided and how an expert might
be helpful.252 The court then must enter an order to show
cause why an expert should not be appointed.253 The court
then may request nominations from the parties, and may ap-
point an expert agreed upon by the parties or appoint an expert
of its own choosing.254 Regardless of whether the court chooses
its own expert or one agreed upon by the parties, hearings
249. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, at 706-14 (stating that Rule 706
"will ordinarily be invoked considerably before trial"); MCL 2D, supra note 119, §
21.5 ("Vell in advance of the final pretrial conference, the court should consider
submitting complicated factual disputes to an expert ').
250. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 12 ("One judge mentioned that an
earlier appointment would have been helpful in recruiting skilled experts, remarking,
S [w]ith more time it may have been possible to choose among several ex-
perts.' ").
251. See Botter, supra note 155, at 74 ("Judges do not investigate a case before tri-
al When the problem surfaces at trial it is probably too late for effective judi-
cial action."). But see WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, at 706-15 ("It is hard,
because of the broad scope of discovery, to conceive of civil cases in which the need
for a neutral expert would not become apparent until trial.").
Tlus discussion assumes that the court is appointing an expert sua sponte.
Where one of the parties moves that an expert be appointed, the court need not
identify the need.
252. See Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1983) (directing parties
to discuss appointment of an expert); Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d
Cir. 1962).
253. FED. R. EviD. 706(a).
254. Id.
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should be held at which the parties have an opportunity to scru-
timze the expert's credentials and make known any objec-
tions. 5 After the expert is selected and he consents to act,
the court must draw up strict duties for the expert. The expert
is informed of these duties either in writing or at a conference in
which the litigants have an opportunity to participate.256 The
expert then must inform the parties of any findings,257 and do
so early enough to give the parties an opportunity to depose the
expert and prepare for trial.5 During the trial itself, the wit-
ness is subject to cross-examination by each party, including the
party calling the witness. 9 The expert also may be called to
testify by the court."'
Establishment of an Expert Witness Program
Two primary obstacles remain to the development of a work-
able procedure for the appointment process and usage of experts:
how experts might be chosen and how and when experts would
be paid. One suggestion that could address both problems, as
255. The Manual for Complex Litigation outlines the importance of the selection
process as follows:
The most important factor when the court appoints experts is their selec-
tion. Only those whose fairness and expertise m the field cannot be gen-
uimely questioned should be considered, and the court should select some-
one who can communicate effectively as a witness. Although the appoint-
ment is made by the court, every effort should be made to select a per-
son acceptable to the litigants.
MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.51. See also FED. R. Civ. P 16(c), which reads, m
pertinent part,
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take
action with respect to (10) the need for adopting special procedures
for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve
complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems
FED. R. CIV. P 16(c). See also infra note 264 (positing that there is a small likeli-
hood that the parties will be unable to decide upon a mutually agreeable impartial
expert).
256. FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
257. Id.
258. WILLGING, supra note 170, at 5. One bar association has recommended that
Rule 706 specify that the final report of the expert's findings be available to the
parties at least 30 days before the trial date. Id. at 5 n.17.
259. FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
260. Id.
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well as capitalize on the centralization and cost-spreading
strengths of the three fora, is the establishment of an "Expert
Witness Program" managed by the Clerk of the Court or a sim-
lar central office. The Expert Witness Program ("Program")
could establish a clearinghouse of experts and provide a means
to pay the impartial experts in a timely fashion.
In 1952, the Supreme Court of New York County developed a
similar project to appoint impartial medical experts to cope with
the problems resulting from the plethora of personal injury cases
in that jurisdiction."' The Program contemplated herein uses
the New York Medical Expert Testimony Project ("New York
Project") as its model.
Development of an Expert Clearinghouse
The Program could assemble a list of professionals in a num-
ber of different fields with valuation expertise."2 Each judge
could make use of the list when an expert was needed, thus
spreading the costs of the list's compilation and maintenance
between numerous actions. Procedurally, the court could hold a
pretrial conference with the parties at which it would establish
which experts were available to serve, run through the names of
potential witnesses, and offer each party a number of perempto-
ry challenges to the list."' The judge would appoint his own
261. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK ON THE MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY
(1956) [hereinafter IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY]. The problems the New York pro-
ject was meant to address were court congestion and "battles of the experts." Id. at
6-10. The authors of the report estimated that '80 per cent of the cases in the trial
courts of the country are personal injury cases, involving the taking of medical tes-
timony." Id. at 3. The project was "aimed both at improving the quality of justice,
providing more certainty for reaching right results, and at expediting the judicial
process, thus reducing delay in the disposition of cases." Id. at 3. The project ad-
dressed the justice and efficiency concerns outlined in the first part of this Note. See
supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
262. In the case of the Tax Court and Court of Federal Claims, lists of experts on
real estate appraisal, artwork appraisal, and appraisal of the shares of a close corpo-
ration could be assembled. In the case of the Delaware Chancery Court, lists of
equity analysts and other experts able to provide valuations of companies m certain
industries (e.g., oil and gas, aerospace, financial, or manufacturing) could be assem-
bled.
263. See MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.51.
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expert or do without a court-appointee if the parties could not
agree on an expert."
Courts could look to local and national professional and aca-
demic societies as a source of experts."5 Such societies not only
provide many experts from whom to choose as well as facility of
commumcation and solicitation, but also serve as prescreemng
devices for courts otherwise unfamiliar with expert credentials.
The New York Project's experience in this regard is particularly
encouraging. Its solicitation of local medical societies resulted in
the testimony of experts of a particularly high quality-experts
who had not, or would not, testify previously 26
As an alternative to contacting professionals and academics
through their membership in societies, the Program could also
rely on experts who had served previously in a partisan capaci-
ty 267 The establishment of a corps of experts might lead even-
tually to the perception by professionals and academics of ser-
vice as a court-appointee as a civic responsibility, similar to jury
duty or duty as a court-appointed attorney Service could be
encouraged as a means of fostering good will in the community
or lending stature to the individual and the profession as a
264. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, at 706-16 to 706-17. Hopefully this
situation would not arise very often. The Manual for Complex Litigation suggests
that it should not be difficult to find an expert acceptable to the parties. "Concur-
rent nominations by the parties, a procedure recogmzed in Rule 706, will usually
result in lists containing several names in common." MCL 2D, supra note 119, §
21.51.
265. See MCL 2D, supra note 119, § 21.51 ("The court may also call on professional
organizations and academic groups to provide a list of qualified, willing, and avail-
able persons.").
266. See IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 261, at 4 ("The physicians
thus brought to the service of the court were not merely 'experts' They were
men in the highest ranks of their profession."). These lugh-quality experts might not
have otherwise had occasion to impart their wisdom to the court. They might have
found themselves alienated by the judicial system or might have viewed the process
of expert testimony as beneath them. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
In addition, they might have been excluded by the process of partisan expert shop-
ping, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text, when they did not espouse a
view favorable to either party.
267. The court also nught seek out experts through legal advertisements. The Na-
tional Law Journal publishes an annual Directory of Appraisers, in which experts
advertise their ability to appraise a variety of assets ranging from machinery, real
estate, and common stock, to stamps and rare books. Directory of Appraisers, NAT'L
L.J., June 21, 1993, at S1-S12.
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whole. Such service might even come to be seen as an honor, a
badge of the high esteem in which a professional or academic is
held by his peers and the courts, similar to the manner in which
testimony before Congress or administrative agencies is now
viewed.
Compensatzon of Court-Appointed Experts
Not only could the Program establish a list of qualified ex-
perts, but it could serve as a solution to the complex compensa-
tion considerations which work to discourage judicial appoint-
ment of experts."' Pursuant to Rule 706, a judge normally has
the discretion to apportion the costs of an impartial expert to the
parties as he sees fit.269 A court could make the losing party
pay the cost of the impartial expert.7 The court might assess
the cost of the expert to both of the parties, either ratably or in
some other sum.2 ' These solutions, however, entail the
experts' waiting to be paid for perhaps several years while the
case is resolved.272
One means of circumventing this whole dilemma would be to
remove the question from judges' consideration altogether, and
allow the Program to administer compensation. The New York
Project paid experts out of a fund established by grants from
private foundations." 3 It was "agreed at the outset that no
268. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reticence to
appoint experts because of the difficulties in compensation).
269. FED. R. EVID. 706(b) ("[Clompensation shall be paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs.").
270. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 410 cmt. b (1942) ("[No doubt in the
usual case the judge will provide that the expense of the experts will be taxed as
costs and paid by the loser."); see also supra note 174 (listing commentators who
recommend that expert fees be taxed as costs to the losing party).
271. See Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F Supp. 1304, 1312 n.21
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding in a patent case that in the interests of justice, court-ap-
pointed expert fees be shared equally by the parties).
272. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
273. IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 261, at 4. The funding problem
was solved "by the public-spirited generosity of the Alfred P Sloan Foundation and
the Ford Motor Company Fund." Id. Alfred Sloan was the former President of Gen-
eral Motors Corporation. A cynic might take interest in noting that both of these
philanthropic organizations were founded on the proceeds of the automobile industry,
perhaps the single largest beneficiary of the New York Project's efforts to mitigate
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party to a case should be permitted to pay such [expert witness]
fees," apparently out of fear that such payment would bias the
expert."4 A similar fund could be established to pay valuation
experts. Such a fund might be of a general nature, financed by
public money or nominal court fees imposed on parties to litiga-
tion in the specialty fora.27
A fee fund would not only alleviate the burden of devising and
enforcing a just and practical compensation scheme, but would
remove a potential disincentive for experts to serve. The fund
would ensure prompt payment of fees. The expert could be paid
immediately upon Ins services being rendered if a fund were
already established and available before trial, and thus the
expert would not have to suffer the lost time value of his money
While public funding for such a project might be controversial,
the experience of the New York Project demonstrates that the
net savings to the public of the establishment of an expert wit-
ness program could be enormous. The New York Project spent
$20,383.35 on expert witness fees over a two-year period.27
During that two-year period, 238 cases were referred to
experts,277 120 were settled7 . and only thirty-six went to tri-
al.279 At the time the Project was conducted, each day of trial
in a New York court "[would have cost] the taxpayers, very con-
servatively, $750. ""2' Thus "[assuming], again very conserva-
tively, that each [case] would have taken three trial days, we see
the explosion of personal injury litigation.
274. Id.
275. The fund might also be specific to each action, financed by the litigants them-
selves through the posting of a bond or similar security prior to the appointment of
an impartial expert. While there is some precedent for the posting of a bond in the
context of a preliminary injunction, FED. R. Civ. P 65(c), this seems to be an ex-
traordinary requirement. To require such a bond in a routine valuation action would
seem to unnecessarily restrict parties' access to the judicial system and place an
artificial damper on litigation.
276. IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTImONY, supra note 261, at 35. Incidental costs of the
Project, such as the salary of the clerk in charge, were absorbed into the ordinary
court budget and could not be specifically identified. Id.
277. Id. at 28.
278. Id. at 29.
279. Id. at 32. The remaining cases had not been disposed of as of the publication
of the report, but further settlements were predicted. Id. at 30.
280. Id. at 35.
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that savings will be effectuated of more than 10 times the
total amount spent for the fees of impartial experts."2"' While
settlements mght have been reached in several of the 120 cases
without appointment of an expert, "most of the cases referred to
panel experts were conspicuously resistant to settlement be-
cause, in the referred cases, plaintiff and defendant differed
markedly as to the extent of plaintiffs injuries."82
In takings actions, one sort of valuation action that this Note
contemplates, public funding of impartial experts is mandated
by Rule 706, which reads, "compensation is payable by law
in civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation
under the [Flifth [A]mendment."2"' The Comptroller General
has determined that in a condemnation proceeding, the Depart-
ment of Justice must pay the fees of an impartial expert.2
This provision is "designed to guard against reducing constitu-
tionally guaranteed just compensation by requiring the recipient
to pay costs."2 5
CONCLUSION
Partisan expert testimony poses numerous problems in litiga-
tion. It adds to the expense of litigation for the parties and the
court system and interferes with the justice system by obfuscat-
ing technical issues and effectively denying less wealthy liti-
gants access to the judicial process. These problems are particu-
larly stark in the context of the routine valuation action, in
which the trier of fact is forced to choose between widely diver-
gent dollar figures.
Of the numerous solutions to these problems that have been
proposed over the years, the use of court-appointed experts
stands out as the most effective as well as the most feasible.
281. Id. This estimate was made "without speculating on the number of settlements
that will be made in the 91 pending cases awaiting trial." Id.
282. Id. at 28.
283. FED. R. EVID. 706(b).
284. Decision of the Comptroller General B-139703 (Mar. 21, 1980), cited in
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, at 706-27, 706 n.1.
285. FED. R. EVID. 706(b) advisory committee's note. An argument could be made
that in the Tax and Claims Court, one of the parties is the government, and thus
expert witness fees should be funded publicly to prevent any takings claims.
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Courts have statutory and common law authority to appoint
experts, but, the manifest deficiencies of expert testimony not-
withstanding, they have been reticent to use this authority For
most judges, the idea of undertaking the convoluted process
necessary to appoint an expert is too time-consunung and too
unfamiliar. In addition, the implication that an impartial expert
may unduly influence the fact finder makes appointment inap-
propnate in most instances.
Three specialty fora hear a great number of valuation actions.
These three courts, the United States Tax Court, the United
States Court of Federal Claims, and the Delaware Chancery
Court, have certain characteristics, such as no right to jury trial,
that work to counteract the shortfalls of impartial expert testi-
mony In addition, these courts have certain umque incentives to
implement a standardized procedure for the appointment of ex-
perts, as well as a particularly good ability to spread the costs
that the development of such a standard procedure would entail.
Court appointed experts would function well in the context of
valuation proceedings and present an opportunity for the courts
to conserve judicial resources while reaching just decisions.
Andrew MacGregor Smth
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